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ABSTRACT—Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue.
There are over 40,000 suicides a year in the U.S., making suicide the tenthleading cause of death in the country. But societal attitudes on the subject
remain decidedly mixed. Suicide is often closely linked to mental illness, a
condition that continues to involve stigma and often triggers irrational fears
and misunderstanding. For many, suicide remains an immoral act that flies
in the face of strongly held religious principles. In some ways, tort law’s
treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting societal views regarding
suicide. Tort law has long been reluctant to permit recovery in a wrongful
death action from a defendant who is alleged to have caused the suicide of
the decedent. In many instances, courts apply a strict rule of causation in
suicide cases that has actually been dubbed “the suicide rule” in one
jurisdiction. While reluctance to assign liability to defendants whose
actions are alleged to have resulted in suicide still remains the norm in
negligence cases, there has been a slight trend among court decisions away
from singling out suicide cases for special treatment and toward an
analytical framework that more closely follows traditional tort law
principles. This Article argues that this trend is to be encouraged and that it
is time for courts to largely abandon the special rules that have developed
in suicide cases that treat suicide as a superseding cause of a decedent’s
death.
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INTRODUCTION
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Suicide has been a controversial topic for centuries. But in recent
years, the subject has garnered increased public attention. A 2018 study
released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported
that suicide rates increased in nearly every state between 1999 and 2016.1
Suicide rates increased by over 30% in half of the states during this
timeframe.2
While the suicide rate has increased for almost every age group,3
suicide is the second-leading cause of death among people between the
ages of 10 and 24.4 The suicide rate for girls in particular between the ages
of 10 and 14 has doubled over the past decade.5 Media reports of school
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Deborah M. Stone et al., Vital Signs: Trends in State Suicide Rates — United States, 1999–2016
and Circumstances Contributing to Suicide — 27 States, 2015, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 617, 617 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6722a1.htm [https://perma.cc/
NR98-CE7T].
2
Id. at 617.
3
See id. at 618 (noting that suicide rates increased for every age group under the age of 75).
4
Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance — United States, 2015, 65 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 2 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/ss/ss6506a1.htm [https://
perma.cc/CHT5-YSJB].
5
The group with the second highest increase in the suicide rate is men between the ages of 45 and
64 (43%). See SALLY C. CURTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STAT. DATA BRIEF: INCREASE IN SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2014, at 3 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db241.htm [https://perma.cc/QD69-NLXH].

2

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314719

iew
ed

113:1 (2019)

Abolishing the Suicide Rule

er
r

ev

and cyber bullying resulting in suicide have increasingly horrified
Americans.6 According to a 2015 report from the CDC involving high
school students, “15.5% had been electronically bullied, 20.2% had been
bullied on school property, and 8.6% had attempted suicide.”7
Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue.8 There are
over 40,000 suicides a year in the United States, making suicide the tenthleading cause of death in the country.9 Roughly 18% of those who commit
suicide are veterans,10 and the Veterans Administration estimates that
twenty veterans commit suicide every day.11 The risk of suicide cuts across
any number of demographic lines, including race/ethnicity,12
socioeconomic status,13 and sexual orientation.14

6
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See Samantha Schmidt, After Months of Bullying, Her Parents Say, A 12-Year-Old New Jersey
Girl Killed Herself. They Blame the School., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/02/after-months-of-bullying-a-12-year-old-new-jersey-girl-killedherself-her-parents-blame-the-school [https://perma.cc/9A5K-4Q5C]. The case of Michelle Carter, who
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for encouraging her friend to commit suicide through a
series of texts, shocked the public in 2017. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Guilty Verdict for
Young Woman Who Urged Friend to Kill Himself, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
06/16/us/suicide-texting-trial-michelle-carter-conrad-roy.html [https://perma.cc/92ZA-GSWS].
7
Kann et al., supra note 4, at 1.
8
Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Suicide Rate Surges to a 30-Year High, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/health/us-suicide-rate-surges-to-a-30-year-high.html
[https://perma.cc/37FN-AMAT].
9
Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2014, 65 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 1 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FWL-AAB5]; Gregg
Zoroya, 40,000 Suicides Annually, Yet America Simply Shrugs, USA TODAY, (published Oct. 9, 2014,
3:39 PM, updated Oct. 10, 2014, 9:45 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/09/
suicide-mental-health-prevention-research/15276353 [https://perma.cc/QYJ2-RVUF].
10
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA Research on Suicide
Prevention, https://www.research.va.gov/topics/suicide.cfm [https://perma.cc/E2YX-BA4Y].
11
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA Suicide Prevention Program: Facts About Veteran
Suicide
(July
2016),
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/Suicide_Prevention_FactSheet_New_VA_
Stats_070616_1400.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EL-JTY5].
12
American Indians and Alaska Natives have the highest suicide rate in the United States, followed
by Caucasians. The rate among African Americans is significantly lower. AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE
PREVENTION, Suicide Statistics, https://afsp.org/about-suicide/suicide-statistics [https://perma.cc/
7AMM-PESH] (citing CDC numbers).
13
According to a World Health Organization study, “75 percent of suicides occur in low- and
middle-income countries.” See Tanya Basu, The New Demographics of Suicide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/the-new-demographics-of-suicide/379961
[https://
perma.cc/33ZM-HMK9] (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING SUICIDE: A GLOBAL IMPERATIVE
11 (2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/131056/9789241564779_eng.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A3BD-NUB4]). One study of suicides in Fulton County, Georgia, found that those who
committed suicide “tended to live in lower income areas compared with the general population of
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Just as the risk of suicide cuts across demographic lines, societal
attitudes toward suicide are remarkably heterogeneous. Several studies
have shown disparities between men and women when it comes to their
views as to the acceptability of suicide.15 Geographic, socioeconomic,
political, and religious differences have also been shown to influence
attitudes toward suicide.16
One reason for this divergence of views is that suicide raises
complicated and deeply personal issues. Suicide is often closely linked to
mental illness,17 a condition that continues to attract stigma and often
triggers irrational fears and misunderstandings.18 For many, suicide remains
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Fulton County.” David C. Purselle et al., Differential Association of Socioeconomic Status in Ethnic
and Age-Defined Suicides, 167 PSYCHIATRY RES. 258, 260 (2009).
14
See Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious
Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 223 (2008)
(summarizing studies showing greater incidence and risk of suicide among LGBT youth); Stephen T.
Russell & Kara Joyner, Adolescent Sexual Orientation and Suicide Risk: Evidence From a National
Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1276, 1278 (2001) (reporting results of survey finding “that youths with
same-sex orientation are more than 2 times more likely than their same-sex peers to attempt suicide”);
Jamiles Lartey, Risk of Poverty and Suicide Far Higher Among Transgender People, Survey Finds,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/dec/08/transgendersurvey-suicide-poverty-unemployment-mental-health [https://perma.cc/HA66-276C] (reporting results
of survey finding that 40% of transgender individuals surveyed “said they had attempted suicide in their
life, almost nine times the US overall attempted suicide rate”).
15
Judith M. Stillion & Bethany D. Stillion, Attitudes Toward Suicide: Past, Present and Future,
38 OMEGA 77, 81–82 (1998–99).
16
Id. at 82–83. Age may also play a role. See Benedict Carey, How Suicide Quietly Morphed into a
Public Health Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/health/suicidespade-bordain-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/XDB5-ETNG] (quoting physician as saying that “[w]e are
seeing somewhat more tolerant attitudes toward suicide” among younger people).
17
One frequently cited statistic is that 90% of suicide cases involve mental illness. Zoroya, supra
note 9. This figure remains subject to dispute. See SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL
LAWS 101 (2016) (stating that this figure is “based on bad science, and the best researchers and most
famous suicidologists acknowledge it”). But the research does suggest that those with mental health
issues have higher rates of suicide than the general population. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2012 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION: GOALS
AND OBJECTIVES FOR ACTION 101 (2012), https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/nationalstrategy-suicide-prevention/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/65X4-6GCT] (listing those with mental
health conditions as being at greater risk of suicide); Jennifer M. Boggs et al., General Medical, Mental
Health, and Demographic Risk Factors Associated with Suicide by Firearm Compared with Other
Means, 69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 677, 679 (2018) (reporting results of study finding that 61% of suicide
deaths involved at least one mental disorder, “with the highest prevalence for alcohol use, anxiety,
depression, and sleep disorders,” and that over half of suicides studied involved individuals who had a
psychiatric disorder diagnosed in the year prior to suicide death).
18
See Susan D. Carle, Analyzing Social Impairments Under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1109, 1172 (2017) (noting that “persons with social
impairments [including mental illness] face the problem of stigma”); John V. Jacobi, Mental Illness:
Access and Freedom, 16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2016) (noting the historical
stigmatization of people with mental disorders and the accompanying consequences); Debbie N.
Kaminer, Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace: Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate
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an immoral act that flies in the face of strongly held religious principles.19
Others simply view those who die by suicide as being selfish or weak.20
Still others view suicide as a tragic and preventable outcome,21 or in some
instances, a matter of rational, individual choice.22
In some ways, tort law’s treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting
societal views regarding suicide. Tort law has long been reluctant to permit
recovery in a wrongful death action from a defendant who is alleged to
have caused the suicide of the decedent. In many instances, courts apply a
strict rule of causation in suicide cases that has actually been dubbed “the
suicide rule” in one jurisdiction.23 Courts have rested their conclusions on a
variety of grounds, but many of the decisions reveal a fundamental unease
with the idea of assigning responsibility to defendants in such cases.24 This
is true even where the defendant is alleged to have engaged in intentional
wrongdoing as opposed to mere negligence and in some cases where the
defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress.25 As this Article
explains, this majority approach to wrongful death cases involving suicide
reflects a straight line from nineteenth-century American judicial decisions,
which themselves have as their origin English law from the Middle Ages.26
These older decisions are based on the then-prevailing views regarding
morality and mental illness. While reluctance to assign liability to
defendants whose actions are alleged to have resulted in suicide still
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Protection?, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 217 (2016) (discussing the perception among some that mental
illness is a character defect); Wayne Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for
Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 951, 951 (1992) (“Anglo-American society historically has
viewed the mentally ill as outsiders.”); Elizabeth A. McGuan, Note, New Standards for the Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: “Danger” Redefined, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 181, 184 (2009)
(“To be labeled ‘mentally ill’ means to be included in a group that has been viewed with aversion and
fear throughout history.”).
19
See Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 80 (“Some voices still speak of suicide as sin . . . .”).
20
See Stephanie Chandler, Please Don’t Give Up, WASH. POST (June 8, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/please-dont-give-up/2018/06/08/b3cb84aa-6b42-11e8-bf8c-f9ed2e672
adf_story.html [https://perma.cc/6YYL-5JG8] (noting the view among some that suicide is a selfish
act).
21
Karl Rove, My Mom’s Suicide Was Preventable, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2018, 6:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-moms-suicide-was-preventable-1528929056 [https://perma.cc/V4UBNNJX].
22
See Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 80 (“[O]thers view it as a rational, individual choice,
perhaps even a right.”); Paula Span, A Debate Over ‘Rational Suicide,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/health/suicide-elderly.html [https://perma.cc/P8XN-V8U2] (discussing
the notion of “rational suicide” in the context of suicide among older adults).
23
See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
24
See generally STEFAN, supra note 17, at 12–13 (“The law has always assumed that people are
legally responsible for their suicides and suicide attempts . . . .”).
25
See infra notes 193–232 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 78–104 & 115–23 and accompanying text.
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remains the norm in negligence cases, there has been a slight trend among
court decisions away from singling out suicide cases for special treatment
and toward an analytical framework that more closely follows traditional
tort law principles.27
This Article argues that this trend is to be encouraged and that it is
time for courts to largely abandon the special rules that have developed in
suicide cases that mechanically treat suicide as a superseding cause of a
decedent’s death. Part I describes the historical views regarding suicide in
Europe dating back to the Middle Ages that helped to shape American
attitudes and law. Part II discusses tort law’s treatment of suicide, most
notably the special rules regarding proximate cause and insanity that have
developed in negligence cases. Drawing upon studies into the causes and
predictors of suicide, Part III analyzes the shortcomings of these special
rules. Finally, Part IV argues for an approach based on traditional tort law
principles that recognizes suicide as a public health problem while also
taking into account the special nature of suicide.
HISTORICAL SOCIETAL VIEWS REGARDING SUICIDE

pe

Societal views regarding suicide are ever-changing. The ancient
Greeks were divided as to the acceptability of the practice.28 Roman
attitudes were generally more favorable, but still divided.29 As societal
attitudes toward suicide have changed over time, so too has the law
regarding the subject. The following Part examines the evolving societal
and legal views on the subject of suicide to the present.

ot

A. Societal Views on Suicide and Mental Illness in England Through
the Enlightenment

tn

1. The Middle Ages
During the Middle Ages, suicide was viewed “as the result of diabolic
temptation induced by despair or as mad behavior.”30 Accordingly, one who
took his own life was subject to public scorn.31 The corpse of the decedent
27

rin

See infra notes 310–61 and accompanying text.
See GEORGE MINOIS, HISTORY OF SUICIDE: VOLUNTARY DEATH IN WESTERN CULTURE 43–46
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1995) (summarizing competing schools
of thought).
29
Id. at 46–47.
30
Id. at 9.
31
Interestingly, class played a role in how suicide was viewed, according to one account. A noble’s
suicide, “whether he sacrificed himself for the cause he was defending or killed himself for love, in a fit
of anger, or because he was afflicted by madness, was seen as altruistic. In all cases, it was excusable.”
Id. at 16. In contrast, the peasant’s suicide was viewed as an act “born of egotism and cowardice” and
an attempt to escape his responsibilities. Id.
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was subjected to such punishments as being dragged through the streets,
tortured, or hanged.32 Popular plays and works of fiction of the era
portrayed suicide as sinful and “the result of a despair inspired by the
devil.”33 Those who committed suicide were, in the words of St. Bruno,
“Satan’s martyrs.”34
Religion heavily influenced societal views regarding suicide during
this time. The biblical commandment “Thou shalt not kill” provided the
basis for Christianity’s strong condemnation of suicide.35 St. Augustine’s
book The City of God, published in the fifth century, took an unequivocal
stance against suicide.36 According to Augustine, suicide was never
justified, whether it be the result of a desire “to escape from temporal
difficulties” or to avoid rape.37 Augustine’s work influenced the Christian
edicts that followed, including the denial of Christian burial rites for those
who committed suicide and the excommunication of those who attempted
suicide.38 Writing in the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas explained
that since life is a gift from God, “God alone has authority to decide about
life and death.”39 Suicide, then, amounted to an offense against God.40
At the time, the act of suicide was often attributed to insanity, with the
decedent having succumbed to melancholia or “frenesy” (frenzy).41 But
mental illness itself was also closely linked to sin in medieval thinking. In
the early Middle Ages, mental illness was often viewed as the result of
sinfulness or demonic possession.42 And even into the later Middle Ages,
mental illness was sometimes attributed to possession.43
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Id. at 7. In one case, the decedent’s body was ordered to be carried “to some cross way” and
have a stake driven through her breast and buried so that the stake could be seen as a warning to others
against suicide. HOWARD I. KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND: A
PSYCHOCULTURAL BIOLOGY OF AMERICAN SUICIDE 18–19 (1989).
33
MINOIS, supra note 28, at 13.
34
Id. at 32.
35
See id. at 27.
36
See id.; GEORGE HOWE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 157 (1991).
37
MINOIS, supra note 28, at 27–28 (quoting ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, BOOKS I–IV, at 61
(Demetrius B. Zema & Gerald G. Walsh trans., Fathers of the Church 1950)).
38
See COLT, supra note 36, at 158.
39
Id. at 159 (quoting 38 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: INJUSTICE 33 (Marcus
Lefébure ed. & trans., Blackfriars 1975)).
40
See id.
41
MINOIS, supra note 28, at 38.
42
See id. at 30 (“In the Anglo-Saxon penitentials of the eighth and ninth centuries, only the insane
or the possessed are excused from punishment for suicide, and then only if they had lived honorably
before falling into the clutches of the devil.”). There was a distinction at the time between those who
were born with some type of mental impairment (known as fools or idiots) and those who became
mentally incompetent (or “insane”) later. See Wendy J. Turner, Mental Incapacity and the Financing of
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During the later Middle Ages, mental illness was usually attributed to
physiological causes.44 The prevailing theory was that there were four
humours—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile—that influenced
human behavior. An abnormality in any of them could produce mental
disorder. For example, black bile was associated with melancholy, so an
excess of black bile could produce what today would most likely be
diagnosed as schizophrenia or depression.45 “Frenzy” was caused by yellow
bile, resulting in an overheating of the brain.46 Treatment ranged from
herbal remedies to exorcism.47
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2. The Enlightenment
The idea that the devil was responsible for suicide was still somewhat
common at the dawn of the eighteenth century.48 But European attitudes
toward suicide were also gradually evolving and loosening somewhat
around this time.49 There still remained strong opposition to the practice,
but the Enlightenment led to increased debate in philosophical and popular
works concerning the morality of suicide.50 Importantly, it was during this
era that suicide became identified more as a physiological concern than a
moral or religious one.51 While some of the treatments for mental illness
and suicidal tendencies seem odd by twenty-first-century standards, there
was at least a general recognition that there were physiological causes for
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War in Medieval England, in THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR (PART II): DIFFERENT VISTAS 387, 388 (L.J.
Andrew Villalon & Donald J. Kagay eds., 2008).
43
See Simon Kemp, Modern Myth and Medieval Madness: Views of Mental Illness in the
European Middle Ages and Renaissance, 14 N.Z. J. PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (1985) (noting that Thomas
Aquinas, writing in the thirteenth century, viewed possession as one form of insanity). Witchcraft was
also believed to be the cause of some mental illness. See Richard Neugebauer, Mental Handicap in
Medieval and Early Modern England: Criteria, Measurement and Care, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL
DEFICIENCY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PEOPLE WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 22, 22 (David
Wright & Anne Digby eds., 1996) (citations omitted). Some historians have argued that the extent to
which madness was attributed to sin and the supernatural in general in medieval times has been
overstated. See Jerome Kroll & Bernard Bachrach, Sin and Mental Illness in the Middle Ages,
14 PSYCHOL. MED. 507, 507 (1984).
44
Kemp, supra note 43, at 5 (discussing medieval notions of mental illness and noting that the
English legal records from the thirteenth century forward often identified the causes of insanity as
physical).
45
See id. (discussing the humours theory of mental imbalance).
46
See Claire Trenery & Peregrine Horden, Madness in the Middle Ages, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HISTORY OF MADNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 62, 67 (Greg Eghigian ed., 2017).
47
See Kemp, supra note 43, at 6.
48
See MINOIS, supra note 28, at 191 (“[B]elief in the intervention of the devil had not completely
disappeared from either the popular mind or religious attitudes.”).
49
Id. It was also around this time that the word “suicide” began to be used. Id. at 181.
50
See id. at 241 (explaining the trend “toward the idea that suicide was a result of madness or
physiological malfunction,” which “helped to relieve suicide of guilt”).
51
Id.
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the conditions.52 As suicide became less associated with sin and more with
insanity, there were also increased calls to decriminalize suicide in the
second half of the eighteenth century.53
This increased focus on physiological explanations for mental illness
also apparently led to an increased focus on the concept of insanity and its
supposed connection to suicide. As the number of people committed to
asylums and “madhouses” increased during the eighteenth century,54 the
perception that insanity was closely connected to suicide grew. The fact
that a dead person had a history of institutionalization or treatment for
mental illness often led to a finding of suicide, “no matter how frail the
other evidence was.”55 The connection between suicide and insanity
solidified during this time to the point that “[a] majority of intellectuals . . .
thought that madness was a component in most suicides.”56 By the end of
the eighteenth century, the typical finding in suicide cases in England was
that the decedent suffered from insanity at the time.57

B. Societal Views on Suicide and Mental Illness in the United States
Through the Present

tn

ot

pe

The Puritans initially brought with them to the New World the view
that those who committed suicide had given in to Satan’s temptations.58
Thus, those who committed suicide were deemed sinners and denied a
Christian burial.59 But the American colonies were developing at a time
when European attitudes were also evolving. So, while the Massachusetts
Bay Colony originally refused to recognize insanity as a defense to a
charge of suicide, the neighboring Providence Plantations declared that “a
lunatic, mad or distracted man” could not be convicted.60 By the end of the
seventeenth century, the Rhode Island view was more in keeping with the
view in England and other colonies that mental illness provided an excuse
for the otherwise wrongful nature of the act of suicide.61
52
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For example, one theory attributed mental illness to the influence of the moon on the
atmosphere, which could cause derangement of the brain. Id. Possible treatments for melancholia
included showers, chimney soot, and wood lice. Id. at 244.
53
Id. at 245; see also id. at 295–96 (discussing attitudes in France).
54
Id. at 245. According to one source, “people of the eighteenth century had the decided
impression that the insane had increased in number.” Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 28.
58
Id. at 15, 21.
59
Id. at 21.
60
Id. at 22–23.
61
Id.

9

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314719

iew
ed

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

tn

ot

pe

er
r

ev

As the country grew during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
suicide became increasingly linked with insanity. An 1844 article
appearing in The American Journal of Insanity advised that in most cases
of suicide, “the individual was known to be melancholy, and partially
insane.”62 The best course of care for individuals who were “reserved and
melancholy” and had lost affection for family and business was “a
residence in a well-directed Lunatic Asylum—for usually such persons
need medical treatment.”63 According to one source, by the 1840s, “expert
opinion concerning the etiology of suicide became the province of that
small group of physicians charged with administering asylums for the
insane.”64
Gradually, new theories as to the causes of suicide emerged.65 The
medical field continued to debate the causes of suicide and the extent to
which insanity was associated with suicide throughout the rest of the
nineteenth century. The field of neurology eventually developed toward the
end of the century, further influencing study of the issue.66
As scientific views regarding the causes of suicide became more
sophisticated, the American public’s views on the subject became more
diverse. Suicide is still often linked with mental illness in the minds of
many Americans,67 and mental illness remains a stigmatic condition in our
society.68 Some also continue to view suicide as immoral.69 But researchers
have found that societal attitudes can vary dramatically depending upon
one’s religious beliefs, geographic location, and other factors.70 Overall,
however, it seems clear that Americans have become more tolerant of
suicide in terms of its morality.71 For example, in 1950, only 36% of
Americans believed that a doctor should be allowed to end a patient’s life
by painless means if the patient has a disease that cannot be cured and the

62

Id. at 35.
Id. at 35–36.
64
Id. at 37.
65
See id. at 42–51 (discussing theories). Émile Durkheim’s 1897 work Suicide was widely viewed
as an important step in the understanding of suicide for its argument that suicide may be caused by
multiple social factors and not simply physiological ones. See generally id. at 2–3 (discussing the
importance of Durkheim’s work).
66
See generally KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 51–52 (discussing the medical field’s views regarding
suicide during this time).
67
See Alan H. Marks, Historical Suicide, in 1 HANDBOOK OF DEATH & DYING 309, 316 (Clifton
D. Bryant et al. eds., 2003) (citing results of a survey).
68
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69
See Marks, supra note 67, at 316.
70
See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Marks, supra note 67, at 316.
71
See Marks, supra note 67, at 316.
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patient requests it.72 By 2016, that number had risen to almost 70%.73
Americans also increasingly view individuals as having a moral right to
take their own lives in some circumstances. A 2013 Pew Research Center
poll found that 56% of respondents believed an individual has a moral right
to take his or her own life where the individual has an incurable disease.74
Sixty-two percent of respondents believed such a moral right exists if an
individual is suffering great pain and has no hope for improvement.75 These
numbers reflect a 7% increase just from 1990.76 At the same time, there is
evidence that Americans are less tolerant of suicide where the reason is that
the decedent suffers from depression or chronic pain as opposed to an
incurable disease.77
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C. The Law’s View of Suicide and Mental Illness
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1. Early Legal Views in the United States
Judicial decisions involving suicide reflect a similar evolution in
thinking in the United States. Surveying legal history, the Supreme Court
observed in Washington v. Glucksberg that “for over 700 years, the AngloAmerican common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of
both suicide and assisting suicide.”78 For example, a sixteenth-century
British decision declared suicide to be a felony because it is an offense
“against nature, against God, and against the King.”79 Blackstone famously
described suicide as “[s]elf-[m]urder, the pretended heroism, but real
cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers who destroyed themselves to avoid
those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure.”80 Blackstone
explained the felonious nature of suicide, in part, as an offense against the
king (“who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects”), and, in
part, against God (in that suicide “invade[es] the prerogative of the
Almighty, and rush[es] into his immediate presence uncalled for”).81
72
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Art Swift, Euthanasia Still Acceptable to Solid Majority in U.S., GALLUP (June 24, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/193082/euthanasia-acceptable-solid-majority.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5QVA-EQQS] (reporting results of Gallup poll).
73
Id.
74
PEW RESEARCH CTR., Views on End-of-Life Medical Treatments, Chapter 2: Views on the
Morality of Suicide (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/chapter-2-views-on-themorality-of-suicide [https://perma.cc/64JP-CYEA].
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 83.
78
521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997).
79
Hales v. Petit (1562) 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (QB).
80
Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31–32 (Ct. App. 1960) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 189 (8th ed. 1778)).
81
Id.
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English common law even carved out a special punishment for those who
took their own lives. If sane, the decedent’s act was a crime (felo de se) and
his personal property was confiscated; if the decedent was determined to be
insane (non compos mentis), there was no forfeiture.82
This view of suicide as a felony originally carried over into Colonial
American law. A majority of colonies retained the common law
classification of suicide as a felony.83 Some colonies also carried over the
forfeiture provisions of English common law.84 But, notably, colonies also
increasingly recognized insanity as an excuse for suicide. Even in Puritan
Massachusetts, coroners attempted to divine whether the decedent “knew
the consequences of the act” and thus “voluntarily and feloniously, as a
felon, of himself[] did kill and murder himself[].”85 By the end of the
eighteenth century, most of the colonies had decriminalized suicide and
rejected forfeiture provisions based on the harsh impact on the families of
those who committed suicide.86 But the moral and (to a lesser extent) legal
disapproval of suicide continued into the nineteenth century.87
As the nineteenth century progressed, suicide was less frequently
deemed a crime.88 But the special legal issues raised by suicide persisted.
82
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See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711–12 (summarizing the law); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 18–19
(discussing the role of insanity). During the sixteenth century in England, the vast majority of cases
involving suicide resulted in a finding that the decedent was responsible for his actions. MINOIS, supra
note 28, at 62. The fact that forfeiture was a lucrative source of income for the Crown and that the
coroners in suicide cases received compensation for every verdict of suicide perhaps explain this
outcome. See also id. (discussing relevant laws at the time and postulating “that an entire branch of the
royal administration, from the local coroner to the king’s almoner, had an interest in a strict application
of the laws on suicide”).
83
See Suzanne M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1027
(2003) (“The colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, New Hampshire, New
York, and Maryland all accepted the English common law’s treatment of suicide as a punishable
crime.”).
84
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712–13.
85
KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 25 (quoting Massachusetts law). Notably, “[s]uicide remained a
crime in Massachusetts until the late nineteenth century.” Id. at 29. According to one source, juries
often stretched to conclude that suicide was the result of insanity so as to avoid the harsh effects of
forfeiture. See STEFAN, supra note 17, at 14.
86
See MINOIS, supra note 28, at 297; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713 (“[T]he movement
away from the common law’s harsh sanctions . . . reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to
punish the suicide’s family for his wrongdoing.”); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 30 (“[B]y the later
eighteenth century, jurisdictions from Massachusetts to Virginia” had started to “accept the notion that
suicide was an act whose commission was itself sufficient punishment”). Suicide was not formally
decriminalized in England until 1961. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 c. 60.
87
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712–14 (discussing history); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 26 (“Some
Massachusetts Protestants continued to connect suicidal thoughts with diabolical temptation far into the
eighteenth century . . . .”).
88
George P. Smith, II., All’s Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 290 (1989).

12

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314719

iew
ed

113:1 (2019)

Abolishing the Suicide Rule

tn

ot

pe

er
r

ev

Issues related to suicide most commonly came up in the context of
insurance cases in which a family sought to collect on an insurance policy
covering a decedent who had committed suicide.89 While the language in
the contracts varied, they uniformly prohibited recovery where the insured
committed suicide. The legal principle that typically emerged from these
decisions (as well as British decisions around the same time90) was that the
decedent’s suicide voided the right to collect insurance proceeds unless the
decedent’s insanity prevented the decedent from understanding the
consequences of his actions or the decedent was compelled by an insane
impulse he could not resist.91 Drawing upon the criminal law, some courts
explained that the act of taking one’s own life was not truly “suicide” if the
decedent was insane.92 If that were the case, recovery under an insurance
policy could be permitted.
This, in turn, led to a question as to the definition of insanity. Under
the famed M’Naghten rule in the criminal context, to establish the defense
of insanity, the criminal defendant had to establish that the defendant did
not understand the nature or quality of the criminal act, or if he did, that he
did not know the act was wrong.93 In the insurance policy cases, some
courts took the position that if the decedent could not understand the moral
implication of the act of taking his own life—if he could not distinguish
between right and wrong—the decedent was insane and his act did not
amount to suicide in the legal sense.94 Other courts took the position that
the ability of the decedent to understand the wrongness of the act of his
taking his own life was irrelevant; what mattered was whether the decedent
understood the nature and consequences of his act.95 If not, the decedent
was insane, the act was not suicide, and recovery could be had under the
insurance policy.
Regardless of the exact approach, American courts were essentially
applying the English common law principles regarding forfeiture and
insanity.96 If “insane”—however that term was defined—the decedent was
not blameworthy and his family’s right to recover under the insurance
89
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Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 584–88 (1872); Dean v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 Mass.
(4 Allen) 96, 107–08 (1862); Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 308–09 (1853).
90
Clift v. Schwabe (1846) 136 Eng. Rep. 175, 175 (CP) (cited in Daniels v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424, 425 (Mass. 1903)); Borradaile v. Hunter (1843) 134 Eng. Rep. 715, 715 (CP)
(cited in Daniels, 67 N.E. at 425).
91
See Terry, 82 U.S. at 584–87 (summarizing decisions).
92
Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 54 Tenn. 567, 577 (1872).
93
M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (HL).
94
Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 577–78.
95
See id. at 575 (summarizing the position of English courts on the issue).
96
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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policy should not be forfeited. If the decedent was not insane, forfeiture
was appropriate.97
Issues of morality frequently appeared in these decisions, with courts
sometimes referring to suicide as “sinful and immoral,”98 as well as noting
that suicide was wrong from “a religious and moral point of view.”99 In an
1898 decision, the Supreme Court explained that an insured’s act of taking
his life should not be interpreted as being part of the parties’ contemplation
at the time the agreement was entered into, because a contract “which is
subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court
of justice.”100 These decisions also tended to reflect then-current societal
attitudes regarding mental illness, using such terms as “lunatic,”101
“madman,”102 “madly insane,”103 and “raving madness.”104
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2. Modern Legal Views on Suicide
As societal views regarding suicide evolved, so too did the law’s
approach to cases involving suicide. While some twentieth-century
opinions continued to express moral disapproval of suicide,105 explicit
97
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The issue of how one party’s alleged insanity should influence resolution of legal issues
impacting that party has, of course, been an issue outside the narrow confines of tort and insurance law.
See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science, 49 CONN. L. REV. 891, 891
(2017) (discussing the concept of a delusion in making legal determinations regarding mental capacity
in the context of wills).
98
Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 424–25 (1877); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Milward, 118 Ky. 716, 722 (1904) (“The act of suicide is not only unnatural, but is highly immoral and
criminal.”); Benard v. Protected Home Circle, 146 N.Y.S. 232, 235 (App. Div. 1914) (referring to
suicide as illegal and immoral).
99
Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 570–71 (quoting jury instruction); see Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan &
Tr. Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 302 (1853) (“The facts establish that the assured well knew that by throwing
himself into the river he would be drowned, and that he intended to drown himself and knew it was
morally wrong to do so.”); see also Dean v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 96, 101 (1862) (“He
may have acted from an insane impulse, which prevented him from appreciating the moral
consequences of suicide.”).
100
See Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 169 U. S. 139, 154, 160 (1898) (holding that decedent’s
death, “if directly and intentionally caused by himself, when in sound mind, was not a risk intended to
be covered, or which could legally have been covered”).
101
Breasted, 8 N.Y. at 301.
102
Id. at 305.
103
Id. at 301.
104
Dean, 86 Mass. at 100. An 1872 U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning the insurance policy
issue referenced a book entitled A Practical Treatise on the Law Concerning Lunatics, Idiots, and
Persons of Unsound Mind from 1833. See Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 588 n.26 (1872) (citing
JOHN ARMSTRONG, THE ART OF PRESERVING HEALTH 131 (1796) and LEONARD SHELFORD, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND,
at xlvi (1833)).
105
See, e.g., Blackwood v. Jones, 149 So. 600, 601 (Fla. 1933) (“No sophistry is tolerated in
consideration of legal problems which seek to justify self-destruction as commendable or even a matter
of personal right, and therefore such an argument is unsound which seeks to prove that an accusation
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references to suicide being an immoral act began to appear less frequently
in judicial decisions. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health106 and Washington v. Glucksberg,107 both of which
involved end-of-life issues, could hardly avoid the moral issues present.
But the decisions lacked the sort of moral admonishment of earlier
decisions and recognized that the decision to end one’s life could be
rational.108 Today, courts dealing with cases involving a decedent’s decision
to take her own life are now more likely to acknowledge the difficult moral
issues involved and to refrain from the sort of condemnation present in
earlier decisions.109
Despite the changes in societal and legal views regarding suicide, the
fact that suicide is involved in a case still complicates the legal analysis.
There are still occasional references to the traditional societal disapproval
and moral issues surrounding suicide.110 Mental illness, which is often an
underlying cause of suicide, remains a problematic and sometimes
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unfounded in fact that a person sought to destroy his or her own life is not reprehensible but a normal
thought reflecting in no wise upon the wickedness of the person accused of suicide.”).
106
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
107
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
108
See id. at 747–48 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that an adequately informed patient might
make a rational choice for assisted suicide).
109
One of the more noteworthy decisions in this regard is Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont.
2009), a case involving the constitutionality of state homicide statutes in the case of physician-assisted
suicide. There, the majority opinion spoke at length about the language surrounding the issue and the
majority’s decisions with respect to the language it used. The majority noted its decision not to use the
term “suicide” given the fact the term “suggests an act of self-destruction that historically has been
condemned as sinful, immoral, or damning by many religions.” Id. at 1226.
“Suicide” is a pejorative term in our society. Unfortunately, it is also a term used liberally by the
State and its amici (as well as the Dissent) in this case. The term denigrates the complex
individual circumstances that drive persons generally—and, in particular, those who are incurably
ill and face prolonged illness and agonizing death—to take their own lives. The term is used to
generate antipathy, and it does. The Patients and the class of people they represent do not seek to
commit “suicide.” Rather, they acknowledge that death within a relatively short time is
inescapable because of their illness or disease. And with that fact in mind, they seek the ability to
self-administer, at a time and place of their choosing, a physician-prescribed medication that will
assist them in preserving their own human dignity during the inevitable process of dying. Having
come to grips with the inexorability of their death, they simply ask the government not to force
them to suffer and die in an agonizing, degrading, humiliating, and undignified manner. They
seek nothing more nor less; that is all this case is about.”
Id.
110
See Haines v. Davies, Nos. 1:07–cv–00851, 1:07–cv–00852, 2009 WL 331433, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 9, 2009) (considering motion to exclude evidence relating to suicide because “suicide is viewed by
some as a sinful, immoral, violent act, and therefore may be prejudicial”); Seals, Inc. v. Tioga Cty.
Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“To commit suicide is in the minds of
many a reprehensible, even immoral and sinful act.”); infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text
(discussing still-existing special rules regarding suicide).
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stigmatic condition.111 Finally, suicide raises difficult questions of causation
and foreseeability for courts.
II. TORT LAW’S TREATMENT OF SUICIDE CASES
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Tort law’s historical treatment of cases involving suicide represents a
combination of society’s traditionally negative views regarding suicide and
tort law’s traditional concerns with foreseeability and expanding liability in
cases involving emotional injury. Courts developed special rules dealing
with suicide that worked to limit the scope of liability for a defendant
whose actions allegedly resulted in a decedent’s suicide. These special
rules, which were developed at an earlier time with an earlier
understanding of the causes of suicide, continue to influence the law of
negligence and intentional torts.

A. Negligence Cases

pe

Tort liability for negligence that contributes to a decedent’s suicide is
difficult to establish. In cases in which a defendant engaged in affirmative
conduct that contributed to the decedent’s suicide, plaintiffs often face
significant problems establishing the proximate cause element of a
negligence claim. While not as severe, plaintiffs face similar problems in
cases in which a defendant is alleged to have negligently failed to prevent a
suicide.
Causation Issues in Cases Involving Affirmative Conduct
Resulting in Suicide
In order to establish liability, a negligence plaintiff must establish that
the defendant’s breach of duty was a proximate cause of her injuries.112
While proximate cause is a concept that is largely incapable of precise
definition, the main focus is upon foreseeability.113 If the injuries that
resulted from the defendant’s negligence were within the scope of
foreseeable risk caused by the defendant’s behavior, proximate cause
exists.114 In situations in which a defendant’s negligent actions have helped
contribute to a decedent’s suicide, courts have developed several special
rules regarding proximate cause in cases involving suicide that operate to
limit liability.
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1.

111
112

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed.

ep

1984).

113

Pr

See id. at 263 (“There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”); id. at 280 (discussing the
role of foreseeability).
114
See id. at 281 (discussing the concept of scope of risk).
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a. The standard suicide rule
One of the earliest statements of the law regarding suicide and
proximate cause appears in the 1881 Supreme Court case of Scheffer v.
Railroad Co.115 Scheffer killed himself after suffering physical and mental
injuries as a result of a train collision.116 His executors brought a wrongful
death action, alleging that the negligence of the train company caused
Scheffer’s suicide.117 The Court sustained the defendant’s demurrer,
holding that the proximate cause of Scheffer’s death “was his own act of
self-destruction.”118 Suicide “was not the natural and probable
consequence” of the defendant’s negligence and, therefore, “could not have
been foreseen,” according to the Court.119 Subsequent courts followed this
same logic, concluding that suicide is “so highly extraordinary or
unexpected” that it falls outside “the realm of reasonable foreseeability as a
matter of law.”120
This idea that suicide is an unforeseeable consequence of a
defendant’s negligence, and therefore the efficient or superseding cause of
death, is now widely accepted among U.S. courts.121 Indeed, the rule is
actually known as “the suicide rule” in at least one jurisdiction.122 Some
formulation of this rule has been adopted in nearly every jurisdiction.123
115

105 U.S. 249 (1881).
Id. at 250.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 252.
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 57A AM. JUR.
2D Negligence § 652 (1989)).
121
See Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
general rule is that “suicide is said to be a supervening cause of the victim’s loss of his life, breaking the
chain of responsibility that would otherwise link the loss to the negligent act”); Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 28, 39 (Ct. App. 1960) (stating that “the practically unanimous rule is that [suicide] is a new and
independent agency which does not come within and complete a line of causation from the wrongful act
to the death and therefore does not render defendant liable for the suicide”); see also Brouhard ex rel.
Estate of Brouhard v. Village of Oxford, 990 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Generally, a
decedent’s suicide is considered an unforeseeable intervening act between the defendants’ conduct and
the decedent’s death.”); Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (“The general rule . . . is that
[n]egligence actions for the suicide of another will generally not lie since the act or suicide is
considered a deliberate intervening act exonerating the defendant from legal responsibility . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
122
Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 2009) (referring to the “Illinois
‘suicide rule’”).
123
See Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275; Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 183 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1966); Tate, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 40; Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 436 (Colo. App.
2007); Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Conn. 1997); Porter v. Murphy, 792 A.2d 1009, 1015
(Del. Super. Ct. 2001); District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1275 (D.C. 1987); Appling v.
Jones, 154 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 330 (Haw. 1996);
Little v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 203 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ill. 1965); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v.
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This rule has been applied in a variety of factual settings, from
disseminating allegedly dangerous fantasy games to children124 to
negligently misdiagnosing potentially fatal diseases.125
Issues of proximate cause are typically issues of fact for the jury to
resolve.126 But in wrongful death cases involving suicide, courts frequently
apply the suicide rule and conclude as a matter of law that proximate
causation is lacking.127 Sometimes the rule is applied in rote fashion without
further elaboration.128 In other instances, courts explain that suicide is such
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McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. 1994); Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2000);
Epelbaum v. Elf Atochem, North America, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 431 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (applying
Kentucky law); Bertrand v. Air Logistics, Inc., 820 So. 2d 1228, 1231, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 2002);
Sindler v. Litman, 887 A.2d 97, 109–10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 67 N.E. 424, 426 (Mass. 1903); Costigan v. Plets, No. 298286, 2011 WL 6376016, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Dec. 20, 2011); Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2014);
Krieg, 781 P.2d at 279; Long v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 932, 933 (Neb. 1922);
McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983); Brenner v. Pub. Serv. Prod. Co., 164 A. 454,
455 (N.J. 1933); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1199 (D.N.M. 2008) (applying New
Mexico law); Cauverien v. De Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Fischer v. Morales,
526 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943, 949 (Okla. 1973); Ferris
v. Cleaveland, No. 3:10-1302, 2012 WL 2564782, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2012) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948); Rains v. Bend of the River,
124 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Exxon Corp. v. Breecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 523–24 (Tex.
1975); Lenoci v. Leonard, 21 A.3d 694, 699–700 (Vt. 2011); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 292 P. 436,
444 (Wash. 1930); R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo. 1994). Nevada, Oregon, and Utah appear to be
the only states not to address the issue, although Nevada has at least considered the general issue in the
context of a workers’ compensation claim. See Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00793-APGGWF, 2017 WL 1483428, at *8 (D. Nev. Apr. 21, 2017) (“Nevada has not yet addressed whether
suicide is an intervening act that breaks the chain of causation between a defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s injuries.”); Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Nev. 2008) (discussing
causation in the context of workers’ compensation). Virginia’s treatment of such cases is discussed
infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. West Virginia has recognized claims based on the failure to
prevent suicide, see Moats v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 189 (W. Va. 1999), but has not
expressly ruled on whether the traditional suicide rule bars recovery where a defendant is alleged to
have caused the suicide, see Setser v. Harvey, No. 14-0680, 2015 WL 1741136, at *3 (W. Va. Apr. 10,
2015). At least one state, Texas, has adopted a statute providing an affirmative defense in the case of
suicide that roughly tracks the standard suicide rule:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to a civil action for damages for personal injury or death that the
plaintiff, at the time the cause of action arose, was:
...
(2) committing or attempting to commit suicide, and the plaintiff’s conduct in committing or
attempting to commit suicide was the sole cause of the damages sustained; provided, however, if
the suicide or attempted suicide was caused in whole or in part by a failure on the part of any
defendant to comply with an applicable legal standard, then such suicide or attempted suicide
shall not be a defense.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 93.001 (West 2018).
124
Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
125
Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987).
126
Wood v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 419 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 2018).
127
See, e.g., Long, 187 N.W. at 932, 934.
128
Cf. Lenoci, 21 A.3d at 699–700 (choosing to elaborate before applying the rule).

18

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314719

iew
ed

113:1 (2019)

Abolishing the Suicide Rule

an abnormal act that it breaks the chain of causation and amounts to a
superseding cause.129 Occasionally, plaintiffs are able to survive a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment on these claims, but in the typical case, a
decedent’s suicide serves to break the chain of causation and bar
recovery.130
Judge Richard Posner has explained the underlying justification for
the general rule:
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A person is not liable for such improbable consequences of negligent activity
as could hardly figure in his deciding how careful he should be. Liability in
such circumstances would serve no deterrent, no regulatory purpose; it would
not alter behavior and increase safety. Nothing would be gained by imposing
liability in such a case but compensation, and compensation can be obtained
more cheaply by insurance.131

pe

But other considerations have also clearly influenced courts.
Longstanding concerns over the morality of suicide still linger to some
extent in more modern decisions.132 For example, suicide remains a
common law crime in Virginia.133 And in Virginia (as in several other
states), “a party who consents to and participates in an immoral or illegal
129
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The idea that suicide is an “abnormal thing” or usually the result of an abnormal mental
condition appears frequently in the decisions. See, e.g., Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp.
1286, 1292 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (“With few exceptions, one who commits suicide is suffering some
abnormal mental condition.”). Many of the references to suicide being an “abnormal thing” come from
a passage in Prosser & Keeton on Torts, which courts often quote:
Some difficulty has arisen in cases where the injured person becomes insane and commits suicide.
Although there are cases to the contrary, it seems the better view that when his insanity prevents
him from realizing the nature of his act or controlling his conduct, his suicide is to be regarded
either as a direct result and no intervening force at all, or as a normal incident of the risk, for
which the defendant will be liable. The situation is the same as if he should hurt himself during
unconsciousness or delirium brought on by the injury. But if the suicide is during a lucid interval,
when he is in full command of his faculties but his life has become unendurable to him, it is
agreed that his voluntary choice is an abnormal thing, which supersedes the defendant’s liability.
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 221–22 (Tenn. 1965) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 273–74 (2d ed. 1955)); see also Tucson Rapid Transit Co.
v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 185 (Ariz. 1966) (same); Estate of Girard v. Town of Putnam, No.
CV085002754–S, 2011 WL 783599, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011) (same).
130
Compare MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying
Tennessee law and affirming summary judgment in defendant’s favor in case involving harassing debt
collection), with Burdett v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1234, 1237 (D. Kan.
2003) (overruling motion to dismiss in case involving harassing debt collection results).
131
Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2001).
132
See Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1001–02 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (attributing some of the
special treatment of suicide cases to the association of suicide with criminality); Delaney v. Reynolds,
825 N.E.2d 554, 557 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that cases from other jurisdictions cite to “the
historic notion that suicide is an immoral or culpable act” as a policy underlying the general rule); see
also Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I. 1996) (noting that suicide remains a
common law felony in Rhode Island).
133
Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992).
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act cannot recover damages from other participants for the consequence of
that act.”134 Negligence defendants have had some success in asserting that
suicide is an immoral or unlawful act and thus bars recovery.135
An element of blameworthiness or culpability also arguably underlies
the general rule that suicide constitutes a superseding or efficient cause.136
Typically, the concept of a superseding or efficient cause refers to the
actions of a third party or some outside force, rather than the conduct of the
plaintiff.137 But some courts have explained that the plaintiff’s conduct may
qualify as a superseding or efficient cause where it is highly extraordinary
and where the conduct “is more than mere contributory negligence and is
of a higher culpability level than the defendant’s negligence.”138 At least
one court has pointed to this principle in concluding that suicide qualifies
as such a cause.139

pe

b. The “delirium or insanity” (or “rage or frenzy”) exception
The most common exception to the rule that a decedent’s suicide
amounts to a superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation is where
the defendant’s negligence brings about “delirium or insanity” that causes
the victim to commit suicide.140 The exception appeared in the first
Restatement of Torts in 1934 and was carried over in Section 455 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The exception provides for liability where a
defendant’s negligence results in the plaintiff’s “delirium or insanity,”
which

134
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Id. (quoting Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Va. 1949)); see also Tug Valley Pharmacy,
LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo, 773 S.E.2d 627, 638–39 (W. Va. 2015) (Loughry, J., dissenting)
(noting that this rule has been adopted in thirteen jurisdictions).
135
See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying this rule and affirming
judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant); Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692, 694 (W.D.
Va. 1991) (applying this rule and granting summary judgment for defendant). See generally Moats v.
Preston Cty. Comm’n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 188, 189 (W. Va. 1999) (declining to adopt this prohibition).
136
See Allen C. Schlinsog, Jr., Comment, The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or
Wrongfully Deceased?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 471 (1991) (attributing the special causation
rules regarding suicide to the “public policy concern that the suicidal decedent was culpable”).
137
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. at
571 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (discussing the superseding cause concept and noting “employing
superseding cause to bar a plaintiff’s recovery based on the plaintiff’s conduct is difficult to reconcile
with modern notions of comparative responsibility”).
138
Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D
Negligence § 652 (1989)); see also Mesick v. State, 504 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (App. Div. 1986) (stating
rule).
139
Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275.
140
See, e.g., Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 810 (R.I. 1996) (applying this
exception); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing this
exception).
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(a) prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of
harm involved therein, or
(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity
which deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with
reason.141
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The comments explain that the first clause only applies when the
plaintiff’s delirium or insanity (also frequently referred to in the decisional
law as “rage” or “frenzy”142) “is so extreme as to prevent him from
understanding what he is doing” or from understanding the consequences
of his actions.143 In support of the rule, the second Restatement authors cited
several cases in which a defendant’s negligence caused physical harm to
the decedent, which also severely impacted the decedent’s mental
capacity.144 The ultimate question in most of these cases was whether the
defendant’s negligence caused the decedent to be unable to understand the
physical nature and consequences of his act.145 As originally envisioned by
the authors, this first clause was an extremely limited exception to the
general rule that suicide breaks the chain of causation for purposes of a
wrongful death claim. Liability could be imposed only where the
defendant’s negligence caused physical harm so extensive that it actually
impacted the decedent’s mental functioning to the point that the decedent
could not understand that his actions were likely to lead to his own death.146
141

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
Prill v. Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1, 8 (Ala. 2009); City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573,
578 (Ga. 2017); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 706–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Nguyen
v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 96 N.E.3d 128, 139 n.12 (Mass. 2018); Maloney v. Badman, 938 A.2d 883, 887
(N.H. 2007); Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Wis. 1960). The same phraseology is also used
in the workers’ compensation setting in determining whether a suicide qualifies as a compensable
injury. See Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Nev. 2008).
143
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. b.
144
Id. § 455 reporter’s notes; Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424 (Mass. 1903);
Millman v. U.S. Mortg. & Title Guar. Co., 1 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1938); Koch v. Fox, 75 N.Y.S. 913 (App.
Div. 1902); Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 67 S.E.2d 63 (N.C. 1951); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 292 P.
436 (Wash. 1930).
145
See, e.g., Long v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 934 (Neb. 1922).
146
See Eckerd’s, Inc. v. McGhee, 86 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935) (stating there could
be no recovery “unless [the decedent’s] reason and memory were, at the time, so far obscured that she
did not know and understand what she was doing”). The limited nature of the exception is best
illustrated by the two non-suicide cases cited by the authors. In one, the defendant’s negligence caused
the decedent to suffer a concussion, which resulted in her becoming dizzy and falling out of a window.
Millman, 1 A.2d at 269. In the other, the decedent’s car struck the defendant’s car. Hall, 67 S.E.2d at
64–65. The decedent, “in a dazed and addled condition,” got out of the car, walked out onto the
highway, and was struck by another oncoming car. Id. Thus, both cases involved decedents in a state of
delirium that ultimately resulted in another injury. Both decisions focused almost exclusively on the
issue of proximate cause, specifically whether the defendant’s negligence resulted in a continuous
sequence of events unbroken by any unforeseeable cause. Millman, 1 A.2d at 269–70; Hall, 67 S.E.2d
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The decisions also make clear that in crafting this rule, courts were
borrowing from the older insurance policy cases.147 There appear to be few
modern cases applying this part of the exception.
The second clause in Section 455 applies when the defendant’s
negligent conduct results in a plaintiff’s delirium or insanity, which
produces an irresistible impulse to do an act.148 The plaintiff may recover
even if the plaintiff understands the nature or likely consequences of the
act, provided “his act is done under an insane impulse which is irresistible
because his insanity has prevented his reason from controlling his
actions.”149 None of the cases cited by the authors of the second
Restatement shed much light as to the concept of irresistible suicidal
impulses, perhaps because none of the cases cited actually resulted in a
finding of such an impulse.150 Nonetheless, the idea that an insane impulse
excused the fact of suicide had been floating around in American legal
decisions for quite some time before the adoption of the first
Restatement.151
The limited nature of the exception to the standard rule regarding
suicide and proximate cause is emphasized in a comment to Section 455.
The fact that a defendant’s negligence causes harm to an individual that
results in depression (or “extreme melancholia”) does not make the
defendant liable for the decedent’s suicide.152 This is true even where the
decedent takes his own life “because of his dread of the increasingly
frequent recurrence of these attacks.”153 Unless the defendant’s negligence
causes injury that results in insanity or delirium in a form that prevents an
individual from understanding the nature of his act or that creates an
irresistible suicidal impulse, suicide breaks the chain of causation.154
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at 67. Both courts did include brief mentions of the delirium or insanity rule as described in the first
Restatement of Torts, but the references were included largely to bolster the court’s conclusion
regarding proximate cause. Millman, 1 A.2d at 270; Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 67.
147
See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text; Koch, 75 N.Y.S. at 921.
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. c.
149
Id.
150
In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466 (Mass. 1915); Delinousha v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 161 N.E. 431
(N.Y. 1928); Garrigan v. Kennedy, 101 N.W. 1081 (N.D. 1904).
151
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
152
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. d.
153
Id.
154
The case that most clearly seems to have most directly influenced the authors of the
Restatement was Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424 (Mass. 1903). There, the decedent
was injured at a railroad crossing and killed himself nearly two months later. Id. at 425. According to
medical experts, the decedent “was probably insane when he took his life.” Id. The court expressly
framed the issue regarding the right to recover in terms of proximate cause. Recognizing that the
decedent was probably insane at the time and that his insanity might very well have been caused by the
collision, the court held that the suicide was “an independent, direct, and proximate cause of the death.”
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Despite the fact that this exception has been part of tort law for over a
century, courts are not at all consistent in their application of the
exception.155 Courts generally treat as synonymous the concepts of “mental
illness,” “mental derangement,” and “delirium or insanity.”156 Some courts
require documentation of a mental illness, as opposed to a mere mental
condition (whatever difference there may be between those terms), before
the exception is triggered,157 whereas others do not delineate between the
two concepts158 or otherwise speak primarily in terms of the existence of a
“mental condition.”159 Still others gloss over the initial requirement that the
decedent have been insane or under a delirium and proceed directly to the
question of whether the decedent acted pursuant to an uncontrollable
impulse or otherwise treat an uncontrollable impulse as a form of insanity
itself.160
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Id. at 426. Drawing upon other decisions, the court concluded that “the liability of a defendant for a
death by suicide exists only when the death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is
accomplished . . . without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical nature
and consequences of the act.” Id. This is essentially the same test that appears in Section 455.
155
See Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
(noting problems with the rule as “demonstrated by the various ways” in which courts have applied it).
156
See Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Mass. 1978) (permitting recovery where
plaintiff’s “mental illness” or “mental derangement” resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to kill
herself).
157
See Estate of Ko ex rel. Hill v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 982 F. Supp. 471, 476 (E.D. Mich. 1997),
aff’d 173 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (granting summary judgment where decedent’s expert witness failed
to testify that decedent suffered from a mental illness); Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp.
1286, 1292 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (distinguishing between mental conditions and mental illnesses and
saying “it is essential that a full explanation of the claimed mental illness be offered to assist the trier of
fact in resolution of the question of causation”); Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 438 (Colo.
App. 2007) (drawing a distinction between the terms and concluding that “mental illness” is the more
useful term); Worsham v. Nix, 83 P.3d 879, 887 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (affirming summary judgment
for defendant in the absence of any documentation of mental illness or delirium).
158
See Grant v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 146 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (Ct. App. 1978) (“No fair
distinction may be made between a mental condition, and mental illness or insanity, proximately caused
by another’s tortious conduct which results in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.”); District
of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. 1987) (“‘[M]ental illness,’ ‘mental condition,’ and
‘insanity’ are generally considered synonymous terms, and should be so construed.”).
159
See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983); Orcutt v. Spokane, 364 P.2d 1102,
1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc); see also James A. Howell, Comment, Civil Liability for Suicide: An
Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 573, 575 (noting that some courts permit recovery
where a “mental condition” as opposed to insanity exists).
160
See Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that an
irresistible impulse is a form of mental insanity); Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434,
445 (D.S.C. 2016) (rejecting any requirement that the impulse be caused by insanity and instead
focusing on the existence of the impulse itself).
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In practice, the delirium or insanity exception is of limited value for
plaintiffs.161 The most obvious limitation of the rule for plaintiffs is that
there must actually be some evidence that the decedent was experiencing
“delirium or insanity” that impacted the decedent’s decision-making
process.162 As a practical matter, this will normally require expert
testimony.163 In addition, the fact that an individual was “insane” is not
enough, by itself, to satisfy this exception. The plaintiff must show that the
mental illness actually resulted in an irresistible impulse to commit suicide
as opposed to a mere suicidal tendency.164 For example, in one case, the
decedent’s psychiatrist testified that the decedent suffered from depression
that was a “powerful contributor” to his suicide and that “it had been his
experience that people who kill themselves feel an overwhelming sense of
hopelessness and helplessness so that they cannot think about various
options but can see only one sort of release or relief.”165 According to the
court, this was insufficient to create a question for the jury on the
proximate cause issue because it did not establish that the defendant’s
action caused a condition that “resulted in the decedent’s having an
irresistible or uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.”166
Some plaintiffs are unable to establish that the decedent had an
irresistible impulse to commit suicide due to the fact that the act appears to
have been premeditated. Typically, the more evidence there is that the
decision to commit suicide was thought out in advance, the less likely it is

161
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See Note, Tortious Inducement of Suicide: A Study of the Judicial Ostrich, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q.
166, 166–67 (stating that court decisions applying the exception “render recovery virtually impossible
in circumstances short of complete loss of bodily control”); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Civil Liability
for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217, 227–28 (1971) (noting
that the “stringent requirements” of the test limit its reach).
162
An example of where the resort to the exception proved successful is Young v. Swiney, 23 F.
Supp. 3d 596, 615 (D. Md. 2014). There, the plaintiff’s expert was willing to testify that the decedent’s
suicide “was directly and proximately caused by the psychosis he sustained as a result” of the
defendant’s negligence. Id. at 617. The expert helpfully explained that “[t]he layman’s term for
psychosis would be ‘insanity’” and that the decedent’s suicide was “due to an irresistible impulse when
he was not in his right mind.” Id. at 618.
163
See Sindler v. Litman, 887 A.2d 97, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (explaining that the issue
requires expert testimony); Orcutt v. Spokane, 364 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc)
(concluding a jury question exists “where there is medical testimony that the injury sustained by the
decedent caused a mental condition which resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide”).
164
See Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Baxter v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that expert’s testimony that depression
caused the plaintiff’s suicide was insufficient to create a jury question as to whether plaintiff was unable
to resist the impulse to take her life).
165
District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1277 (D.C. 1987).
166
Id. at 1276.
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the exception will apply.167 For example, Lenoci v. Leonard168 involved a
teenage girl who committed suicide after a traumatic incident. She had
threatened suicide several times before the traumatic incident, going so far
on one occasion as describing her plan to do so.169 On the night after the
incident, she texted several of her friends about the incident, texted her
boyfriend goodbye, composed a suicide note, and then carried out the
suicide plan she had previously described.170 While it seems clear that the
traumatic incident the girl experienced was the triggering event for her
suicide, according to the Vermont Supreme Court, the events leading to her
death were “not evidence of an ‘uncontrollable impulse,’ but rather of a
voluntary, deliberate, and tragic choice by a girl who knew the purpose and
the physical effect of her actions.”171 Accordingly, the court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.172
The final factor limiting the value of the delirium or insanity
exception for plaintiffs is that courts often decide the issue as a matter of
law.173 As is the case with the issue of proximate cause more generally in
suicide cases, questions as to whether a decedent was experiencing
delirium or insanity, could comprehend the consequences of her actions, or
was acting under an irresistible impulse would generally seem to be
questions of fact for the jury.174 But given the specific evidentiary
requirements necessary to invoke the exception,175 courts frequently decide
these issues as a matter of law against plaintiffs.176
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See Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
(citing counterexamples, but stating “the majority of courts have found that if the evidence shows the
decedent planned the suicide and knew what he was doing, no irresistible impulse existed even where it
is clear that the decedent committed suicide as a result of injuries”). But see Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d
263, 268 (N.Y. 1974) (“An irresistible impulse does not necessarily mean a ‘sudden’ impulse.” (citation
omitted)).
168
21 A.3d 694 (Vt. 2011).
169
Id. at 697.
170
Id. at 700.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 701.
173
See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text.
174
See Estate of Van Dyke ex rel. Van Dyke v. Glaxo Smithkline, No. 05–CV–153–J, 2009 WL
10669421, at *5 (D. Wyo. Apr. 14, 2009) (stating that the issue of whether an individual was acting
pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse should ordinarily be a jury question), rev’d on other grounds,
388 F. App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2010).
175
See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary hurdles faced by
plaintiffs).
176
See, e.g., Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 432, 436–37 (Colo. App. 2007); Lenoci,
21 A.3d at 700; Baxter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
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Causation Issues in Cases Involving the Failure to
Prevent Suicide
The other common fact pattern involving civil liability stemming from
suicide is where the defendant fails to exercise reasonable care in
preventing the decedent from committing suicide. Unlike the situation
where the defendant’s negligence allegedly causes the decedent to commit
suicide, these are cases in which the defendant did not act to prevent the
suicide from occurring. A clear example would be the situation where
prison officials fail to take reasonable steps to prevent a prisoner from
committing suicide while in custody.177
The standard suicide rule does not have the same limiting effect in this
context as it does in other cases. Indeed, some courts refer to this situation
as an exception to the traditional suicide rule that treats suicide as a
superseding cause; where the defendant owes an affirmative duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent suicide, suicide is not a superseding cause.178
However, the fact that suicide is involved still tends to limit liability.
Typically, courts do not recognize a duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect another from harm; however, there are several types of special
relationships that can give rise to such a duty, as listed in Section 314A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.179 One noteworthy feature of the suicide
cases is that the number of relationships that courts are willing to recognize
as “special” enough to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
another’s suicide is markedly lower than in other factual scenarios.180 So,
for example, while an employer might have a duty to exercise reasonable
care to assist an employee whom the employer knows is at risk of harm,181
an employer does not have a duty to take reasonable care to prevent an
employee from committing suicide.182 Instead, the general rule has emerged
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See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593–94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
(recognizing an exception to the intervening cause rule for custodians who know or have reason to
know that an inmate might engage in self-destructive acts).
179
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
180
Courts often speak about a “duty to prevent suicide.” See, e.g., Estate of Cummings v. Davie,
40 A.3d 971, 974 n.3 (Me. 2012) (“Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that, barring a special
duty such as that recognized in a jailor-inmate or psychiatrist-patient relationship, there is no duty to
prevent suicide by an adult.”); Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972, 980 (Mont. 1999) (discussing the “duty
to prevent suicide” in the case of custodial relationships); McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125
(N.H. 1983) (speaking in terms of “a specific duty of care to prevent suicide”). The more accurate
terminology would be a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent suicide.
181
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B.
182
See Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs, Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (questioning whether
employer conducted an adequate background check on employee who died by suicide, but refusing to
recognize that a special relationship existed); Olson v. Barrett, No. 6:13–cv–1886–Orl–40KRS,
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that only defendants who have custody over others (e.g., prison officials),
or those with special mental health training (e.g., psychiatrists), and who
have the ability to take steps to prevent the suicide owe such a duty.183 In
recent years, there have also been a number of claims brought against
school officials and school districts who allegedly failed to take steps to
prevent a student’s suicide stemming from bullying.184 Courts have shown a
willingness to recognize the existence of such a duty in these cases.185 But
besides these exceptions, there is generally no duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent another from committing suicide.
The standard suicide rule does not serve as an absolute bar to recovery
in these exceptional, special relationship cases because suicide is no longer
deemed to be an unforeseeable action.186 But the standard suicide rule
regarding causation may still limit a defendant’s liability even in these
kinds of cases. In the prison-suicide cases, for example, courts sometimes
cite the general suicide rule in explaining that a jailer is not liable for
failing to prevent a prisoner’s suicide absent special circumstances.187 As
one court has explained, “‘[s]pecial circumstances’ form the basis of
virtually every decision involving a jailer’s liability for a prisoner’s acts of
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2015 WL 1277933, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) (concluding that employer owed no duty to prevent
an employee “from later committing suicide” where employer knew of “hateful remarks from coworkers” that allegedly contributed to employee’s vulnerable state of mind).
183
As explained by one court,
this duty has been imposed on: (1) institutions such as jails, hospitals and reform schools, having
actual physical custody of and control over persons; . . . and (2) persons or institutions such as
mental hospitals, psychiatrists and other mental-health trained professionals, deemed to have a
special training and expertise enabling them to detect mental illness and/or the potential for
suicide, and which have the power or control necessary to prevent that suicide.
McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 125 (internal citations omitted).
184
See, e.g., Lewis v. Blue Springs Sch. Dist., No. 4:17–cv–00538–NKL, 2017 WL 5011893, at *1
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2017); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D.
Cal. 2014); Butler v. Mountain View Sch. Dist., No. 3:12–CV–02038, 2013 WL 4520839, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 26, 2013); Ferraro v. Glendale Unified Sch. Dist., No. B262428, 2016 WL 2944268, at *7
(Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2016); Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 729 (Ky. 2016); Elissa v. City of
New York, 990 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (Sup. Ct. 2014); Estate of Smith v. W. Brown Local Sch. Dist.,
26 N.E.3d 890, 896 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
185
See, e.g., Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (recognizing that a “strong argument” can be made
that such a duty should exist); Patton, 529 S.W.3d at 729–30 (recognizing the existence of a duty “to
supervise students so as to prevent bullying, to stop bullying as it occurred, and to report bullying to the
Administrators if it occurred”).
186
See White v. Watson, No. 16-cv-560-JPG-DGW, 2016 WL 6277601, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 27,
2016) (“Where the duty of care breached is the duty to protect against what would otherwise be an
unforeseeable consequence, that consequence becomes foreseeable to the defendant, and the breach of
the duty to protect against it can result in negligence liability.”).
187
See, e.g., Pretty On Top v. City of Hardin, 597 P.2d 58, 61 (Mont. 1979); Falkenstein v. City of
Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 792 (N.D. 1978).
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self-destruction.”188 The key is in how a court chooses to define the
concept. Most courts take the view that a jailer may be liable where the
jailer knows or should have known of a prisoner’s suicidal tendencies.189
However, a few essentially adopt a more stringent recklessness or
deliberate indifference standard and limit liability to where the defendant
had actual knowledge that the decedent was likely to commit suicide.190
Therefore, even though courts often speak of the existence of a special
relationship as creating an exception to the general suicide rule,191 the
shadow of the standard suicide rule still looms in such cases.

B. Intentional Tort Cases

pe
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Plaintiffs who allege that a defendant’s intentional misconduct
resulted in suicide face their own set of challenges.192 The most common
intentional tort theory in suicide cases has been intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED).193 The tort is premised on the existence of
extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause distress “so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”194 Therefore, as one
court has noted, IIED, “by its very nature, . . . [has a] closer connection to
suicide than other intentional torts.”195 That said, plaintiffs alleging IIED as
the underlying basis for a wrongful death claim have often faced difficulty
satisfying the demanding standard that the defendant’s conduct was
“extreme and outrageous.”196
188

Pretty On Top, 597 P.2d at 61.
See, e.g., Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
190
See, e.g., Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (stating this rule in the context of school bullying
case); Murdock v. City of Keene, 623 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1993) (stating the rule in the context of
prisoner case).
191
Murdock, 623 A.2d at 756.
192
Not included in this discussion are cases in which a physician or other individual assists the
decedent in the act of suicide. These cases present their own special issues.
193
Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 433 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Most cases applying
intentional tort analysis in suicide cases involve intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .”).
194
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Recklessness may also
suffice in place of intent. Id. § 46(1).
195
Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015).
196
See Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 560–61, 571–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that middle
school vice principal who issued an “unduly harsh” warning to a student and told the student he was
going to end up in juvenile hall, after which the student committed suicide, did not engage in extreme
and outrageous conduct); Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 1:17–cv–01383–JBM,
2018 WL 659862, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) (bullying and alleged sexual abuse by prison guards of
prisoner with psychiatric issues not extreme and outrageous); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp.,
294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1236 (D. Kan. 2003) (concluding on motion to dismiss that defendant’s harassing
debt collection methods did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Epelbaum v. Elf Atochem,
N. Am., Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433–34 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (holding that employer who permitted an
allegedly hostile work environment to exist, under which the plaintiff suffered “mere insults or
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Plaintiffs seeking recovery in suicide cases may face other challenges.
As is the case with negligence claims, establishing that the defendant’s
conduct was a legal cause of the decedent’s suicide sometimes proves
difficult. In the typical intentional tort case, causation typically does not
pose much of an obstacle for a plaintiff. In the case of intentional torts,
courts sometimes permit discovery in the case of “even very remote
causation.”197 As Professors Prosser and Keeton explain, in the case of most
intentional torts, a defendant’s liability extends “to consequences which the
defendant did not intend, and could not reasonably have foreseen.”198 And
as every first-year Torts student knows, a defendant takes his plaintiff as he
finds him.199 Thus, under the famed eggshell-plaintiff rule, “[w]hen an
actor’s tortious conduct causes harm to a person that, because of a
preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristics of the
person, is of a greater magnitude or different type than might reasonably be
expected, the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for all such harm to
the person.”200 This willingness to expand liability for intentional torts
resulting in unforeseeable harms is traditionally justified on the grounds
that one who intentionally causes harm has greater culpability than one
who negligently does so.201 But in the case of recovery for suicide resulting
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indignities” and which ultimately resulted in decedent’s suicide, did not engage in extreme and
outrageous conduct); Mikell v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 33, 972 A.2d 1050, 1055 (N.H. 2009) (granting
motion to dismiss where special education teacher made a false accusation against student in alleged
attempt to affect student’s disciplinary record did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct);
Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App.
Div. 1986) (holding that brainwashing practices of church that allegedly led to decedent’s suicide were
not extreme and outrageous); Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1972) (granting summary
judgment where defendant refused to marry decedent and ended relationship with him); see also Giard
v. Town of Putnam, No. CV085002754S, 2008 WL 5481273, at *10–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3,
2008) (granting motion to dismiss on the grounds that there had not been “affirmative misbehavior”
where defendant guidance counselor failed to stop student’s suicide, despite allegation that defendant
had “received unspecified information that [the student] was suicidal”). Some plaintiffs have been
unable to meet the requirement in an IIED action that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional
distress. See Corales v. Bennett, 488 F. Supp. 2d 975, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
197
Derosier v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An
actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms
than the harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”).
198
KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, § 9, at 40.
199
See Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1988) (“It is well settled that a tortfeasor
takes a plaintiff as he finds him.”).
200
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31.
201
See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So.2d 579, 587 (Miss. 1968) (“A higher
degree of responsibility is imposed upon a wrongdoer whose conduct was intended to cause harm than
upon one whose conduct was negligent.”); Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 497 A.2d 1206, 1209 (N.H.
1985) (“The law of torts recognizes that a defendant who intentionally causes harm has greater
culpability than one who negligently does so.”).
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from a defendant’s intentional tort, courts have developed specific
causation rules that alter the standard approach and may significantly limit
a defendant’s liability.
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1. Intentional Tort Theories as an Alternative to Negligence Claims
Early wrongful death decisions tended not to draw any distinction
between suicide brought about by negligent as opposed to intentional
acts.202 Instead, they sometimes spoke of the “general rule that tort actions
may not be maintained which seek damages for the suicide of another.”203
Thus, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
1921 that the defendants, who had allegedly confined and tortured the
decedent, could not be held liable for the decedent’s act of hurling himself
from a window to his death because his suicide was an intervening cause
that cut off liability for the defendants.204 Importing principles from the
negligence cases, the court concluded that suicide “was not the natural and
probable consequence of the wrongful acts of the defendants.”205 A 1913
Georgia case likewise sustained the defendant’s demurrer on the grounds
that the decedent’s suicide was not the natural result of the defendant’s
conduct, and therefore was not the legal cause of the suicide, despite the
allegation in the complaint that the defendant acted with the specific intent
that the decedent would kill himself.206
Perhaps the first decision to draw a clear distinction between an
intentional tort claim and negligence in the context of a suicide case was
Tate v. Canonica, a 1960 case from California.207 There, a California
appellate court considered a wrongful death claim in which the defendants
were alleged to have “intentionally made threats, statements and
accusations against [the] deceased for the purpose of harassing,
embarrassing, and humiliating him in the presence of friends, relatives and
business associates.”208 The resulting emotional distress eventually led to
the decedent’s suicide.209
202
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See Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1921) (“[I]t is now well established that no action
lies at common law to recover damages for causing the death of a human being by the wrongful or
negligent act of another.”).
203
Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1209.
204
Salsedo, 278 F. at 99.
205
Id. at 96.
206
Stevens v. Steadman, 79 S.E. 564, 566–67 (Ga. 1913); see also Waas v. Ashland Day & Night
Bank, 257 S.W. 29, 31 (Ky. 1923) (sustaining defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that it was not
foreseeable that plaintiff would commit suicide after being falsely accused with a crime and threatened
with imprisonment).
207
5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Ct. App. 1960).
208
Id. at 30–31.
209
Id. at 31.
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The court began by noting that the law had long drawn a distinction
between intentional torts and negligence and did not place as many
restrictions on the concept of causation in the case of intentional
wrongdoing.210 Consequently, the court refused to import the foreseeability
and superseding cause concepts from negligence law.211 Once this
distinction was recognized, it became a relatively simple matter for the
court to conclude that liability could exist for intentional misconduct
resulting in suicide. Under the court’s rule, “where the defendant intended,
by his conduct, to cause serious mental distress or serious physical
suffering, and does so, and such mental distress is shown by the evidence to
be ‘a substantial factor in bringing about’ the suicide, a cause of action for
wrongful death results.”212 Importantly, the court also decided not to import
the delirium or insanity rule used in negligence cases. Citing tort law’s
longstanding reluctance to recognize fewer defenses in the case of
intentional torts as opposed to negligence torts, the court concluded that the
fact that the decedent was insane or could not resist the impulse to commit
suicide was irrelevant for purposes of liability.213
Following Tate, several other courts declined to import the special
causation rules from negligence cases into intentional tort claims involving
suicide.214 In at least two instances, however, courts have modified the other
elements of the Tate approach. In Mayer v. Town of Hampton, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court analogized a wrongful death claim involving
suicide to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.215
Consequently, the court added the requirement that the defendant’s conduct
must be extreme and outrageous before liability can attach,216 thereby
narrowing the scope of liability articulated in Tate. In contrast, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has held that one whose intentional tort causes an
emotional or psychiatric illness that is a substantial factor in bringing about
the suicide of the victim may be liable “even though he does not intend to
cause the emotional or psychiatric illness.”217
210

Id. at 33.
Id. at 35–36.
212
Id. at 36 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LAND, AND
CHATTELS §§ 279–80 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)).
213
Id. at 33, 36.
214
Other decisions recognizing the potential for liability soon followed. See Rowe v. Marder,
750 F. Supp. 718, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121, 128 (Ind. 1994); Clift
v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 811 (R.I. 1996); R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo.
1994).
215
497 A.2d 1206, 1210–11 (N.H. 1985).
216
Id. at 1211.
217
R.D., 875 P.2d at 31.
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Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The Substantial
Factor Rule
Following Tate, most of the courts to consider the issue have similarly
decided against importing foreseeability principles from negligence law.
But like Tate, they have adopted a different causation standard than that
which typically applies in intentional tort cases. Under this approach, a
plaintiff may recover where a defendant acts with the intent to cause
physical or emotional harm and the conduct was a substantial factor in
causing the suicide.218 Courts adopting the substantial factor test frequently
refer to the test as being more stringent than the ordinary causation
standard in intentional tort cases.219 According to a federal court in
Pennsylvania, the substantial factor standard is justified because in the case
of suicide, “the final cause of death always appears as an independent act
of a separate will, always raising the very real possibility that the suicide
was truly unrelated to the defendant’s actions.”220 According to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, “[p]roof of the substantial causation will
usually be based on expert testimony.”221
In practice, the substantial factor standard has not proven to be a
particularly onerous requirement for plaintiffs.222 Indeed, “the fact that a
decedent has a history of mental instability is no automatic bar to finding
the defendant’s conduct to be a substantial factor in causing the suicide.”223
As explained by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, “[s]o long as the
defendant’s wrongful act was a substantial cause of the suicide, there is no
reason in such a case to undermine to [sic] the policy behind intentional
torts which extends a defendant’s liability almost without limit to any
actual harm resulting.”224
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See Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724 (discussing the approach of most courts); see also N. Shore
Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Breslin Assocs. Consulting LLC, No. 02–11760–NG, 2004 WL 6001505, at *5
(D. Mass. June 22, 2004) (applying the rule); Collins v. Village of Woodridge, 96 F. Supp. 2d 744, 756
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 184–85 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1966) (adopting the substantial factor test); Kimberlin, 637 N.E.2d at 127–28 (citing prior decisions and
applying the rule); Clift, 688 A.2d at 812 (citing Tate and adopting its test).
219
See Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724 (explaining that the substantial factor test imposes “a greater
standard of causation than might otherwise be required”); Clift, 688 A.2d at 812 (explaining that the
substantial factor test is “certainly a more stringent test than that employed in typical intentional
infliction of emotional distress cases”).
220
Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724.
221
Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1211.
222
But see Dargie v. County of Hillsborough, No. 93-391-SD, 1995 WL 73339, at *8 (D.N.H. Feb.
23, 1995) (holding that plaintiff failed to meet the substantial causation standard).
223
Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1211.
224
Id.
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Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The
Foreseeability Rule
Other courts have adopted an alternative approach that applies
foreseeability principles from negligence law to intentional tort cases to
limit defendants’ liability. A 2015 decision from a South Carolina federal
district court directly imported the standard suicide rule from negligence
cases in holding that suicide constitutes an intervening force that breaks the
chain of causation.225 To prevail, the plaintiff must fit within either the
irresistible impulse or special relationship exceptions.226
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted a similar foreseeability
standard in suicide wrongful death cases involving intentional wrongdoing
on the part of a defendant. Rejecting the traditional causation standard that
applies in intentional tort cases, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
“plaintiff must plead facts which, if proven, would overcome application of
the general rule that suicide is deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law.”227
The plaintiff must ultimately establish that the suicide was foreseeable,
which, under the court’s approach, means that suicide “was a likely result
of the defendant’s conduct.”228
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3.

Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The Irresistible
Impulse Rule
A handful of courts have held that there can be no recovery for
wrongful death suicide unless the decedent acted from an uncontrollable
impulse and the defendant’s intentional tort was a substantial cause of the
decedent’s impulse.229 Mississippi first adopted this rule in 1968 in a case
involving abuse of process on the part of various defendants to collect
debts from the decedent that ultimately led to the decedent’s suicide.230 In
reaching its decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court referred to several
negligence cases as well as Tate and several pre-Tate intentional tort cases
involving suicide.231 Ultimately, the court cobbled together a rule that
combined aspects of both lines of cases, borrowing the uncontrollable
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225

Watson v. Adams, No. 4:12–cv–03436–BHH, 2015 WL 1486869, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015).
Id. at *8.
227
Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015).
228
Id.
229
State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579, 587 (Miss. 1968); see also Hare v. City
of Corinth, 814 F. Supp. 1312, 1326 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (applying this rule); Cauverien v. De Metz,
188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (same).
230
Richardson, 214 So. 2d at 584.
231
Id. at 586–87.

Pr

ep

226

33

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314719

iew
ed

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

impulse concept from negligence cases and the substantial factor language
from Tate.232
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO SUICIDE IN TORT LAW
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As one reviews the cases involving potential liability for suicide,
several fact patterns reappear frequently. There is the harassing, abusive, or
bullying behavior that results in suicide.233 There is the negligent
entrustment or sale of a firearm or drugs to the individual who later kills
himself.234 There is the friend, counselor, or other confidant who fails to
take action to prevent the decedent from committing suicide.235 There is the
landlord,236 employer,237 or other individual who arguably has a special

232
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See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Mississippi case law on the subject of liability for
negligence in suicide cases seemed, until recently, to be quite restrictive. See Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l
Hosp.–De Soto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2014) (“Nothing in Mississippi caselaw, save the
irresistible-impulse doctrine . . . abrogates the general rule that suicide constitutes ‘an independent,
intervening and superseding event that severs the causal nexus between any wrongful action on the part
of the defendant.’” (quoting Shamburger v. Grand Casino of Miss., Inc./Biloxi, 84 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798
(S.D. Miss. 1998))); Collins ex rel. Irby v. Madakasira, No. 2015–CA–01759–COA, 2017 WL
9480890, at *7 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017) (“Truddle clearly states that an intentional act must be
pled to support a cause of action for suicide.”). In 2018, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that
liability could attach in a case in which the decedent was under the custody and control of a medical
facility and the facility’s negligence helped lead to the decedent’s suicide. Singing River Health Sys. v.
Vermilyea, 242 So. 3d 74, 83 (Miss. 2018).
233
See, e.g., MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 736 (6th Cir. 2007) (harassing debt
collection); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1235 (D. Kan. 2003)
(harassing debt collection); Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135, 141–43
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (harassing supervisors); Doe v. Doe, 67 N.E.3d 520, 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (bullying
of minor); Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994)
(sexual abuse of a minor); Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1965) (domestic abuse).
234
See, e.g., Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (sale of firearm
ammunition); Kelly v. Echols, No. CIV-F-05-118 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 4163221, at *12 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 4, 2008) (sale of prescription drugs); Prill v. Marone, 23 So. 3d 1, 7 (Ala. 2009) (negligent
entrustment); see also Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1277 (Ala. 1993) (negligent
entrustment); Tonn v. Moore, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0372, 2013 WL 1858773, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr.
23, 2013) (negligent entrustment); Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 564, 567–68 (Iowa
1997) (sale of ammunition to minor); Delaney v. Reynolds, 825 N.E.2d 554, 559 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
(negligent entrustment); Splawnik v. DiCaprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (App. Div. 1989) (negligent
entrustment); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (sale of
ammunition to minor).
235
See, e.g., Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (companion); Nally v.
Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 957 (Cal. 1988) (religious counselor); Lee v. Corregedore,
925 P.2d 324, 341–42 (Haw. 1996) (veterans’ counselor); Lenoci v. Leonard, 21 A.3d 694, 698 (Vt.
2011) (friend).
236
See Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (holding that landlord did not have duty
to prevent suicide).
237
See Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding employer
not liable for security guard’s suicide using company-issued firearm); Olson v. Barrett, No. 6:13–cv–
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relationship with the decedent238 who fails to take action to prevent the
decedent’s suicide. And there is the more generic case in which the
defendant’s negligence causes physical or emotional harm to the decedent
that ultimately leads to the decedent’s death.239
Each of these cases involves its own tragic set of facts. Each is painful
to read. But most share one common thread: the plaintiff loses on the issue
of duty or proximate cause.240 There are certainly exceptions, such as the
cases in which a defendant retains custody of an individual and has reason
to know of the individual’s suicidal tendencies.241 But the fact that the
decedent has committed suicide usually makes it quite difficult for the
plaintiff to recover, at least where the defendant’s affirmative conduct is
alleged to have resulted in suicide.
As the following Part argues, while the actual results in many suicide
cases are not particularly problematic, the manner in which courts arrive at
those results and the message that the suicide rule sends about suicide and
mental health are often troublesome. In addition, the failure of courts to
engage in any meaningful analysis regarding proximate cause in these
cases and the special causation rules some courts have developed in
intentional tort cases sometimes lead to problematic results.

A. Nonproblematic Results

tn

ot

The standard suicide rule in tort law is a rule regarding proximate
cause.242 As explained by Professor Dan Dobbs, “[t]he most general and
pervasive approach to . . . proximate cause holds that a negligent defendant
is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by his
negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that
conduct.”243 The general rule treating suicide as an unforeseeable kind of
harm is generally consistent with the medical research regarding suicide.
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1886–Orl–40KRS, 2015 WL 1277933, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) (noting that suicide did not
occur “in the scope or course of employment”).
238
See McPeake v. Cannon, 553 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (attorney); McLaughlin v.
Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 127 (N.H. 1983) (attorney).
239
See Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881) (holding railway company not liable for
suicide of passenger injured in train collision).
240
See, e.g., Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26,
1994) (affirming dismissal on the pleadings in case of sexual abuse of a minor resulting in suicide on
the grounds that suicide is intervening act that breaks the chain of causation).
241
See, e.g., P.W. v. Children’s Hosp., 364 P.3d 891, 896 (Colo. 2016).
242
See supra notes 115–30 and accompanying text.
243
DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 198 (2d ed.
2011).
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In 2003, the American Psychiatric Association developed assessment
guidelines to help mental health professionals assess the risk of suicide in
patients.244 The guidelines were developed after a review of over thirty
years of research and literature in the field.245 However, considerable doubt
within the psychiatric field as to how effective existing risk assessment
methods are at predicting the risk of suicide in specific cases has existed for
some time.246 A 2016 meta-analysis examined thirty-seven longitudinal
studies involving psychiatric patients or people who had made suicide
attempts and who had been classified as being at high or low risks of
suicide.247 The study found that the proportion of suicides among the highrisk patients was 5.5%, in contrast with 0.9% among lower-risk patients,
suggesting “a statistically strong association between high-risk strata and
completed suicide.”248 However, the meta-analysis also revealed “that about
half of all suicides are likely to occur in lower-risk groups” and that “95%
of high-risk patients will not suicide.”249 Thus, despite over forty years of
study, the authors concluded that “[a] statistically strong and reliable
method to usefully distinguish patients with a high-risk of suicide remains
elusive.”250
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. A separate 2016 metaanalysis published in the British Journal of Psychiatry found that

244

ot

there is no robust evidence to support the use of one risk scale over another,
and because all the scales reviewed had a low [positive predictive value] with
significant numbers of false positives these scales should not be used in
clinical practice alone to assess the future risk of suicide.251
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AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF
PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS (2003), https://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/
practice_guidelines/guidelines/suicide.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCM8-28JW].
245
Id. at 7.
246
See Albert M. Drukteinis, Psychiatric Perspectives on Civil Liability for Suicide, 13 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 71, 80 (1985) (“In general, psychiatric prediction of a patient’s potential for
suicide is being questioned more and more.”).
247
Matthew Large et al., Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Cohort Studies of Suicide Risk Assessment
Among Psychiatric Patients: Heterogeneity in Results and Lack of Improvement over Time, PLOS ONE
(June 1, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0156322 [https://perma.
cc/9932-F8HH].
248
Id. at 1–2, 12.
249
Id. at 12.
250
Id. at 2.
251
Melissa K.Y. Chan et al., Predicting Suicide Following Self-harm: Systematic Review of Risk
Factors and Risk Scales, 209 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 277, 281 (Oct. 2016), https://www.cambridge.org/
core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/C9D595168EDF06401A823E2E968915E1/
S000712500024511Xa.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ45-5TGS].
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Researchers who attempted to identify patients at risk for suicide among
4800 veterans admitted for in-patient psychiatric care were unsuccessful in
their efforts, leading to the conclusion that “[i]dentification of particular
persons who will commit suicide is not currently feasible.”252 There are
certainly identifiable factors that increase the risk of suicide. For example,
a 2009 study found that of patients who had been hospitalized after a
suicide attempt, nearly one-third of those who had psychotic symptoms
attempted suicide at least one more time, thus leading to the conclusion that
“[p]sychotic symptoms during major depressive episode increase the risk of
completed suicide after serious suicide attempt.”253 But predicting those
who are most at risk of suicide remains frustratingly difficult.254
The fact that suicide remains an unpredictable occurrence to trained
experts speaks to the foreseeability of suicide for purposes of tort law.
Predictability is not the same thing as foreseeability.255 But foreseeability
does involve some measure of probability of an event’s occurrence. And if
an event occurs infrequently enough under a given set of facts to be
unpredictable, this impacts the foreseeability of the event.256 Moreover,
foreseeability is typically assessed from the perspective of the hypothetical
reasonable person. If experts with superior knowledge regarding suicide
have been unable to develop a reliable method for determining those at a
high risk of suicide, the hypothetical reasonable person will ordinarily not
be able to do better.257
Even where emotional distress is within the foreseeable scope of risk
resulting from a defendant’s conduct, it is the unusual case in which suicide
is the kind of harm foreseeably risked. One can easily foresee that an
intentional wrong or the failure to exercise reasonable care could result in
emotional distress. But the foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis involved in
252
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Alex D. Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide in Psychiatric Patients. Report of a Prospective Study,
40 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 249 (1983), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/
fullarticle/492987 [https://perma.cc/2H8F-WHKN].
253
Kirsi Suominen et al., Outcome of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder After Serious
Suicide
Attempt,
70 J.
CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY
1372,
1372
(2009),
http://www.psychiatrist.com/JCP/article/Pages/2009/v70n10/v70n1005.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MLFSNSM].
254
See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Suicide: Unpredictable and Unavoidable—
Proposed Guidelines Provide Rational Test for Physician’s Liability, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643, 644 (1992)
(“In fact, predictions of the likelihood a specific individual will commit suicide are wrong far more
often than they are right.”).
255
See Drukteinis, supra note 246, at 80 (stating that “the legal use of the term foreseeability and
the concept of predictability are not synonymous”).
256
See id.
257
See id. (stating that “if professionals trained in mental health cannot prevent suicide or even
predict it accurately, then the average citizen certainly has no way of predicting it”).
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proximate cause determinations involves consideration of degrees. Burning
resulting from an explosion caused by an unpredictable chemical reaction
is a different kind of harm than injury resulting from being accidentally
splashed by hot liquid.258 It is not simply the fact that one injury is more
substantial than the other that may take one of the harms outside the scope
of risk. It is the fact that the essence or fundamental nature of the injuries
are different in kind. Suicide involves emotional distress plus the
intentional act of the decedent. In this respect, suicide is ultimately a harm
that is different in kind than the emotional distress that tort law recognizes
as a compensable injury. It is the unusual case where suicide is the kind of
harm that a defendant foreseeably risked by his negligent conduct. Thus, as
a general proposition, the special causation rules in suicide cases usually
produce the correct result.

B. Problematic Reasoning (and Sometimes Problematic Results)

Pr

ep

rin

tn

ot

pe

1. Problematic Reasoning: Proximate Cause
Rote application of the suicide rule produces the correct result in the
run of cases. But not always. In some instances, a court’s application of the
rule effectively short-circuits any real analysis into whether the decedent’s
suicide was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s
negligence.
For example, in R.D. v. W.H., a Wyoming case, the decedent’s family
was able to state a claim by successfully invoking the delirium or insanity
exception to the traditional suicide rule in a negligence case after the court
had explained that suicide is ordinarily treated as an intervening cause that
breaks the chain of causation.259 But it is difficult to understand why there
was a need to resort to the exception in the first place when application of
traditional foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis would almost certainly have
resulted in a jury question. According to the complaint, the defendant (the
decedent’s stepfather) had allegedly sexually abused the decedent
throughout her entire life to the point that she developed psychiatric
difficulties and attempted suicide on several previous occasions.260 The
defendant loaned a gun to the decedent, which she used to try to kill
herself; five days later, the defendant helped the decedent obtain a
prescription for medicine—the same medicine that the defendant knew or
should have known the decedent had used in a previous attempt to kill

258
259
260

See Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1964] 1 Q.B. 518 (Eng.).
R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28–29 (Wyo. 1994).
Id. at 28.
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herself.261 On this occasion, she was successful.262 There is nothing wrong
with articulating a general rule that suicide is not the sort of resulting harm
that is foreseeable from one’s negligence. But in this instance, common
sense would suggest that suicide was the exact harm a reasonable person
could foresee by assisting the decedent in obtaining the prescription. As
such, the decedent’s acts cannot be viewed as a superseding cause if that
term is to have any meaning.263
The fact that the defendant in R.D. v. W.H. had, according to the
complaint, contributed to the decedent’s psychiatric problems through
repeated sexual abuse only strengthens the case for foreseeability. Suicide
is admittedly difficult to predict.264 But there is also a correlation between
sexual and other forms of abuse with long-term psychological problems
and risk of suicide.265 As an example, according to one study, “heterosexual
women who had experienced physical violence by a partner were more
than seven times more likely to report current suicidal ideation than their
counterparts who had not experienced” such violence.266
Courts’ tendency to apply the traditional suicide rule in cases of
alleged negligence involving abusers and to apply similar foreseeability
concepts to claims founded on intentional misconduct precludes jurors
from hearing expert testimony that might shed light on the causal
connection (if any) between the defendant’s conduct and the ensuing
suicide. For example, in a Tennessee case, the decedent’s boyfriend “had
broken her leg, burned her with a cigarette, blacked her eyes, kicked her, []

261
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Id.
Id.
263
See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2006) (“Where the
intervening act’s risk is the very same risk that renders the original actor negligent, the intervening act
cannot serve as a superseding cause.”).
264
See supra notes 244–54 and accompanying text.
265
See Peter J. Fagan et al., Pedophilia, 288 JAMA 2458, 2460 (2002) (noting that child victims of
sexual abuse are at higher risk for mood disorders and suicide).
266
See Courtney E. Cavanaugh et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Suicidal Behavior Among
Adult Female Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 41 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 372,
372–73 (2011); see also John Briere & Lisa Y. Zaidi, Sexual Abuse Histories and Sequelae in Female
Psychiatric Emergency Room Patients, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602, 1602 (1989) (noting that studies
“tend to document high rates of anxiety, depression, dissociation, self-destructiveness, substance abuse,
and interpersonal dysfunction in [male and female] adults who were molested as children” as well as
more frequent diagnoses of borderline personality disorder); Elizabeth Oddone et al., A Meta-Analysis
of the Published Research on the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 135 J. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2001)
(reporting “clear evidence confirming the link between” childhood sexual abuse and posttraumatic
stress disorder, depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, victim–perpetrator cycle, and poor academic
performance); Melissa K. Holt et al., Bullying and Suicidal Ideation and Behaviors: A Meta-Analysis,
135 PEDIATRICS e496, e496 (2015) (conducting meta-analysis and concluding “that involvement in
bullying in any capacity is associated with suicidal ideation and behavior”).
262
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caused her to be bruised and discolored over large areas,” and forcibly
retrieved her from another state after she had attempted to leave him.267
Eventually, the decedent jumped to her death after writing a suicide note
ascribing her actions to the abuse she had suffered.268 Nonetheless, the
Tennessee Supreme Court, applying the suicide rule without further
inquiry, affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the defendant’s
demurrer on the grounds that the decedent’s suicide was unforeseeable and
“an abnormal thing.”269
In an Ohio case, the complaint alleged that a teenager died by suicide
as a result of having been sexually abused by an adult.270 In a brief opinion
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, the Ohio appellate court
perfunctorily cited the standard rule that suicide is generally an intervening
cause that breaks the chain of causation.271 The court then noted that there
was no allegation in the complaint that the alleged abuser knew or should
have known the teen was suicidal when he was abusing the teen, nor was
there any allegation that suicide “is a normal incident of the risk involved
in” sexual abuse of a teen.272 As such, dismissal was proper.273
These kinds of cases present special circumstances that take them
outside of the confines of the standard rule regarding suicide and causation.
Where the risk of the decedent’s act is the same risk that renders the
defendant’s conduct negligent to begin with, the intervening act cannot
serve as a superseding cause.274 If a defendant’s own extreme conduct
foreseeably risks severe emotional injury, the foreseeability arguments and
arguments about the extreme nature of the decedent’s own acts carry
considerably less weight. When current science and everyday experience
suggest that a defendant’s conduct substantially increased the risk of
suicide, it is the worst sort of legal fiction to argue that the decedent’s
actions were a superseding cause and that a jury could reach no other
conclusion.
267

Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tenn. 1965).
Id.
269
Id. at 222.
270
Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994).
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2006) (“Where the
intervening act’s risk is the very same risk that renders the original actor negligent, the intervening act
cannot serve as a superseding cause.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor’s liability is limited to those physical
harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
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2. Comparative Fault Problems
A problem related to this short-circuited proximate cause analysis
involves the defense of comparative fault. Courts sometimes explain that
the decedent’s suicide was “the sole proximate cause” of death.275 The idea
that the decedent’s suicide is the sole proximate cause of death was devised
at a time when the all-or-nothing defense of contributory negligence was
the norm.276 Given the choice of assigning responsibility for a suicide to
one of the two parties, the choice to assign it to the decedent made sense.
The use of the term “sole proximate cause” was certainly unfortunate in
that it implies that there can be only one proximate cause of an injury.277
But the idea was nonetheless defensible.
With tort law’s switch to comparative fault, however, the idea that the
decedent’s suicide was always the sole proximate cause ceased to be
persuasive. Cases outside of the suicide context in which the acts of both
the plaintiff and defendant were found to be proximate causes of the
plaintiff’s injuries and the plaintiff’s recovery was proportionally reduced
became commonplace following the switch to comparative fault.278
Underlying the switch from a contributory negligence to comparative
negligence regime were concerns over fairness; while the plaintiff’s own
fault should justifiably limit recovery, the defendant could sometimes
rightfully be expected to bear some portion of the responsibility.279 Yet, the
idea that the decedent’s decision to take her life was the sole proximate
cause of death remained rooted in tort law with little acknowledgment that
both parties could share legal responsibility for an outcome. In this respect,
blind application of the idea that suicide is the sole proximate cause of the
decedent’s death serves as the functional, if not intentional, equivalent of
the old contributory negligence bar. As Professor Joe King notes, “[t]he
serious misconduct bar reinvests the effect of the plaintiff’s fault with a
275
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See, e.g., La Quinta Inns, Inc. v. Leech, 658 S.E.2d 637, 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he
evidence demands a finding that Mr. Leech’s act of suicide was the sole proximate cause of his
death . . . .”); Jones v. Stewart, 191 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tenn. 1946) (“This intervening act of the
deceased, and not the tort of the defendant, must be regarded as the sole proximate cause of that
death.”).
276
The switch from contributory negligence to comparative negligence began in the 1960s and
1970s. See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which Is the
Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 43 (2003).
277
See generally Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1988) (“The facts of
this case illustrate the principle that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury.”).
278
See, e.g., Breaux v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc.-Gulfport, 854 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003) (explaining that when there is more than one proximate cause, comparative negligence
principles apply).
279
See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar
in Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1062–63 (2002).
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complete bar potential despite a comparative fault scheme, and thus
legitimizes an avenue for the court to end-run the jury.”280 As a result,
application of the principle may sometimes undermine the fairness and
proportionality concerns underlying comparative fault rules.281

C. Problematic Messages
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1. Value Judgments
The special causation rules that apply in the case of suicide represent a
departure from traditional tort principles. It is certainly not uncommon for
special tort rules to develop based on policy or moral judgments. But the
concern in suicide cases is that courts may be applying moral judgments
that were developed centuries ago at a time when societal views on suicide
were evolving.
There are other examples in which tort law departs from its traditional
principles for particular groups of plaintiffs. For example, standard tort
principles would permit a plaintiff to hold a defendant liable where the
plaintiff was injured after engaging in unwise or dangerous conduct and
this conduct was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the defendant’s
negligence.282 It is the unusual case in which the plaintiff’s own negligence
is treated as the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. But where,
for example, a bartender serves an obviously intoxicated patron and that
patron drives under the influence and injures himself, the majority rule is
that the patron may not recover from the individual who provided the
alcohol.283 Some courts explicitly ground their conclusions on the notion
that a patron’s actions in such cases are the sole proximate cause of the
injuries.284

Id. at 1067–68.
See id. at 1063.
282
The plaintiff’s recovery might be limited by comparative negligence principles in such
instances.
283
See Bertelmann v. TAAS Assocs., 735 P.2d 930, 934 n.3 (Haw. 1987) (stating that the majority
rule is that “neither minors nor adults who hurt themselves after becoming intoxicated possess a cause
of action against whoever provided them with liquor”). Statutes play an important part in the law in this
area. See Cuevas v Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 348 (Miss. 1986) (“[W]e do not think the
legislature intended to impose liability upon a dispenser of intoxicants to an adult individual, such as
appellant here, who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and then, by reason of his inebriated condition,
injures himself.”); Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal
for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 563 (2000) (“Relatively few states allow an intoxicated
adult patron to recover from the dramshop for injuries caused by his own intoxication.”).
284
See Bennett v. Godfather’s Pizza, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“The
rationale for not holding the establishment liable is that the voluntary drinking of the alcohol, not the
furnishing of [the alcohol], [is] the proximate cause of the injury.” (internal quotations omitted));
Bertelmann, 735 P.2d at 933 (“Drunken persons who harm themselves are solely responsible for their
voluntary intoxication and cannot prevail under a common law or statutory basis.”); Smith v. Tenth
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This rule in dram shop cases is obviously driven more by policy than
by logic. One of the foreseeable risks one contributes to by serving alcohol
to a visibly intoxicated individual is obviously that the individual will
injure himself in addition to others. Yet, the majority rule is grounded on
the notion that a person should not be permitted to benefit “by his or her
own wrongful act.”285
Professor King has explored the idea that courts sometimes recognize
a special doctrine barring tort claims arising out of serious misconduct.286
King cites as one of his many examples a case in which a teenager was
killed by an unsecured vending machine that fell when he was attempting
to steal drinks.287 The Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s
subsequent products liability claim was barred on the grounds that “[a]
person cannot maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish it, he must
rely in whole or part on an illegal or immoral act.”288 As in the dram shop
cases, the primary justification for what King calls this “serious misconduct
bar” is the notion that a wrongdoer engaged in serious misconduct should
not be permitted to benefit from his wrongdoing by recovering damages.289
King’s survey of the decisional law reveals that sometimes the “serious
misconduct bar” he identifies operates less explicitly.290 In some cases,
courts formally treat the plaintiff’s misconduct as the sole proximate cause
of the plaintiff’s own injuries, despite the negligence of the defendant.291
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Inning, 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298–99 (Ohio 1990) (treating the plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol as the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries in such cases); McClelland v Harvie Kothe-Ed Rieman, Post
No. 1201, Veterans of the Foreign Wars of the U.S., Inc., 770 P.2d 569, 572 (Okla. 1989) (“Claims do
not lie against liquor vendors because—at common law—it is the drink’s voluntary consumption rather
than its sale that constitutes the proximate cause of the injuries sought to be redressed.”).
285
Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 199 (App. Ct. 1917); see also Smith, 551 N.E.2d at 1298
(“Clearly, permitting the intoxicated patron a cause of action in this context would simply send the
wrong message to all our citizens, because such a message would essentially state that a patron who has
purchased alcoholic beverages from a permit holder may drink such alcohol with unbridled, unfettered
impunity and with full knowledge that the permit holder will be ultimately responsible for any harm
caused by the patron’s intoxication.”).
286
King, supra note 279, at 1015.
287
Id. at 1023 (discussing Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 954
(Ala. 1993)).
288
Oden, 621 So. 2d at 954–55 (quoting Hinkle v. Ry. Express Agency, 6 So. 2d 417, 421 (Ala.
1942)).
289
King, supra note 279, at 1017. The dram shop cases are, in some instances, examples of the
serious misconduct bar in action. See Allison K. Goodwin, Comment, One Drunk Driver, Shame on
You, Two Drunk Drivers, Shame on Who: Reconciling the Unlawful Acts Doctrine with Comparative
Fault, 48 N.M. L. REV. 173, 188 (2018) (discussing New Mexico’s “complicity doctrine” in the context
of dram shop cases).
290
King, supra note 279, at 1016.
291
See id. at 1063–64 (discussing cases).
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But as King observes, what courts are actually doing is applying the serious
misconduct bar under the guise of proximate cause.292
The judicial treatment of suicide cases follows a similar format. A few
courts have expressly applied the serious misconduct bar in suicide cases.293
More commonly, courts treat a decedent’s suicide as so extreme or
abnormal as to be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.294 The
history of the suicide rule leaves little doubt that the rule developed, at least
in part, from the historical view that suicide was a criminal or immoral
act.295 Regardless of whether a court expressly applies the serious
misconduct bar or does so under the guise of proximate cause, those who
commit suicide are grouped with drunk drivers, thieves, and others whose
acts take them outside the protection of the law.296
The fact that courts sometimes make policy judgments as part of the
proximate cause element is hardly surprising. The proximate cause element
exists in large measure to ensure that liability is not limitless, and the limits
that courts impose are often based on policy concerns and notions of
fairness.297 But in the case of the special causation rules for suicide cases,
courts are applying legal rules that have their origin at a time when suicide
was widely viewed as sinful and a crime.298 While U.S. society continues to
292

Id. at 1064.
See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. As Professor King notes, there are relatively
few cases in which courts explicitly invoke the serious misconduct rule in barring a plaintiff’s claim in a
suicide case. King, supra note 279, at 1028–29.
294
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
295
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
296
The delirium or insanity exception to the general suicide rule likewise reflects a morality-based
judgment upon those who commit suicide. The insanity or delirium exception is less a rule about
causation than it is a value judgment as to the relative blameworthiness of the parties. The question of
whether a defendant’s conduct resulted in the decedent being insane or unable to resist an impulse to
commit suicide has virtually no relation to the question of whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in a
foreseeable risk of suicide. Instead, like the M’Naghten rule in criminal law, the insanity or delirium
exception reflects a value choice as to the blameworthiness or culpability of the decedent. See generally
Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as
the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 832 (2009) (explaining that the M’Naghten test “focus[es] on
cognitive impairment produced by mental illness that reduces culpability to the extent that the offender
is not blameworthy for his conduct”). The fact that the decedent was supposedly insane at the time of
suicide absolves the decedent of all legal and moral blame for the suicide. See Baker v. Bd. of Fire
Pension Fund Comm’rs, 123 P. 344, 345 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912) (explaining that the decedent
“cannot be said to have been the cause, either morally or legally, of his own death” when his actions
were the result of his insanity).
297
See, e.g., Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Proximate cause is
bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to extend liability for a
defendant’s actions.”); Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1966) (“Some boundary must
be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or
policy.” (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 240–41 (3d ed. 1964))).
298
See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
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view suicide as a tragedy, societal attitudes have evolved since the days
when courts could describe the act as sinful or immoral without fear of
contradiction.299
Citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Judge David L. Bazelon
once observed that “the continued vitality of the common law, including
the law of torts, depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary
community values and ethics.”300 Tort law in particular “operates as a
vehicle through which communities perpetually reexamine and
communicate their values.”301 Yet, courts have developed a morality-based
rule and encased it in amber in the face of evolving societal attitudes and
better psychological understanding of suicide. In the process, they may
sometimes send a message about the nature of suicide that is no longer
shared by the broader community.

tn

ot

pe

2. The “Rage or Frenzy” (or “Delirium or Insanity”) Exception
The “rage or frenzy”/“delirium or insanity” exception presents a
similar problem in terms of messaging. As an initial matter, “insanity” is a
legal concept, not a medical one.302 The terms “rage” and “frenzy” have
even less medical significance. But not only are the terms unhelpful in
helping juries understand the relevant concepts,303 they are actually harmful
in terms of promoting misunderstandings and negative stereotypes.
The use of the term “frenzy”—with its medieval origins304 —conjures
images of snake pit mental hospitals with frightening and dangerous
patients. In order to avoid the strictures of the general suicide rule, family
members bringing a wrongful death action are forced to argue that a loved
one was acting in a rage or frenzy or was insane at the time of the suicide.
The reality is that the most common description of the mental state of those
who have attempted suicide is that they did not want to die; they just

299

See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (citing OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881)).
301
Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1324 (2017); see also Eric
T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 503 (“Tort law has long had close ties to
community values and standards and to shifting concepts of public morality.”).
302
See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 185–86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (“The word
‘insanity’ has no definite legal meaning.”); Pamela A. Wilkins, Competency for Execution: The
Implications of a Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 TENN. L. REV. 713, 722 (2009) (noting that
“insanity is a legal rather than a medical concept”).
303
See generally Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 445 (D.S.C. 2016)
(questioning whether the term “insanity” is “meaningful or appropriate” in the context of a suicide
case).
304
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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wanted the pain they were experiencing to stop,305 a seemingly rational
decision to a person who otherwise sees no realistic end to the pain he or
she is suffering. Moreover, continued use of the term “irresistible impulse”
rightly or wrongly often suggests to courts the idea that the decedent
simply “snapped” or was unable to control his actions.306 In fact, modern
psychiatric understanding of suicide suggests that the decision to take one’s
life often occurs over an extended period of time.307
In short, the continued use of the “rage or frenzy” terminology
furthers stigmatization and misunderstandings associated with suicide,
mental illness, and depression.308 This is especially troubling at a time when
there is increasing acceptance of the idea that suicide is a public health
problem that needs to be addressed through increased research and
prevention.309
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT APPROACH TO SUICIDE CASES

pe

Most of the special causation rules regarding suicide in tort law are
outdated and problematic in their application. It is time for courts to
reevaluate these rules in light of changing conditions. Drawing upon
several fairly recent decisions in the area, the following Part of the Article
proposes alternative rules in the negligence and intentional tort contexts.
These alternative approaches seek to give effect to standard foreseeability
and scope-of-risk analyses and reflect modern understandings of suicide,
including its public dimensions, while also recognizing the special and
sometimes unpredictable nature of suicide.

ot

A. Negligence

tn

In the negligence context, courts need to abolish the blanket rule that
suicide is a superseding cause. Courts also need to eliminate the unhelpful
and harmful rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception altogether. But
courts can continue to recognize the exceptional and usually unforeseeable
nature of suicide in other ways.
305

rin

See Chandler, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency of courts to view
premeditation as evidence that the act of suicide was not the result of an irresistible impulse).
307
See Schwartz, supra note 162, at 234 (explaining that the tendency of courts to confine “the
definition of uncontrollable impulse to a sudden frenzied act . . . does not comport with modern medical
knowledge of mental illness” (footnote omitted)).
308
Similar concerns over stigma and stereotypes exist regarding the M’Naghten rule in criminal
law. See Scott E. Sundby, The Virtues of a Procedural View of Innocence—A Response to Professor
Schwartz, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 168 (1989) (noting the stigma attached to a finding of insanity under
M’Naghten).
309
See Carey, supra note 16 (discussing suicide in terms of a public health issue).
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Establishing a Default Position and Recognizing
Special Circumstances
While most courts continue to apply the general rule that suicide acts
as an unforeseeable superseding cause, some courts are beginning to move
beyond rote application of the suicide rule and its exceptions and toward a
more traditional scope-of-risk analysis.310 Implicit in these decisions is the
recognition that traditional foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis is sufficient
to address the vast majority of these cases without relying upon the fiction
that suicide is a superseding cause as a matter of law. For example, where a
driver negligently rear-ends another driver, resulting in physical injuries
that eventually allegedly lead to suicide, suicide is simply not the kind of
harm the defendant foreseeably risked through her negligence.311 We do not
need a special “suicide rule,” with all of its attendant shortcomings, to tell
us this.
But also implicit in the decisions that are willing to actually take the
proximate cause element seriously in suicide cases is the reality that
sometimes suicide is a foreseeable consequence of a defendant’s
negligence. A 2016 opinion by a federal court in South Carolina provides a
useful way of viewing the issue. After reviewing the decisional law in
South Carolina on the subject of causation in negligence cases involving
suicide, the court observed that the cases are “most sensibly read to provide
that, under normal circumstances, a decedent’s suicide will constitute an
intervening event which defeats any showing of causation.”312 The general
rule “may establish a default position,” but it “cannot be applied in every
case.”313 In short, mechanical application of the suicide rule should not
short-circuit proximate cause analysis; “[e]ach case must be decided largely
on the special facts belonging to it.”314
310
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See Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he
most recent trend is to place less emphasis on the mental state and more on the causal connection.”); see
also Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 575 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming trial court’s denial of
motion for judgment as a matter of law where decedent had recently attempted suicide on two previous
occasions); Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269–70, 1272–73 (Conn. 1997) (affirming jury verdict
for plaintiff and rejecting application of suicide rule); Wozniak v. Lipoff, 750 P.2d 971, 983 (Kan.
1988) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff based on conclusion that being treated for depression made
suicide foreseeable); Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 76–77 (N.D. 1994) (“If the patient’s
act of suicide is a foreseeable result of the medical provider’s breach of duty to treat the patient, the
patient’s act of suicide cannot be deemed a superseding cause of the patient’s death that breaks the
chain of causation between the medical provider and the patient, which absolves the medical provider
of liability.”).
311
See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
312
Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 442 (D.S.C. 2016) (emphasis added).
313
Id.
314
Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948) (quoted in Wickersham,
194 F. Supp. 3d at 441).
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Courts must be willing to look past the boilerplate of the traditional
suicide rule and be willing to recognize the special facts that may be
present that make suicide the kind of harm that the defendant foreseeably
risked through his negligence. Here, the law concerning the theory of
negligent infliction of emotional distress provides a useful parallel.
Courts have long been leery of claims of negligently inflicted
emotional distress.315 While part of the concern involves the potential for
fakery, courts have also expressed a concern that has helped drive the
recognition of the suicide rule: the fear of expansive liability.316 Originally,
courts refused to permit recovery for emotional distress unless the
defendant’s negligence resulted in physical impact, there was some type of
physical manifestation of the distress, or the plaintiff was in the “zone of
danger” of physical injury.317 Several courts eventually observed that
“modern advances made in medical and psychiatric science” helped
alleviate the concerns underlying these special rules.318 Over time, courts
began to move away from these unrealistic and mechanical rules that
foreclosed any real analysis into foreseeability319 and began to recognize
exceptions permitting recovery where the facts presented a greater guaranty
that the alleged distress was likely to be real and that the distress was
actually within the foreseeable scope of risk created by the defendant’s
negligence.320 These included situations in which the claimed distress
315
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See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L.
REV. 789, 807–08 (2007) (noting courts’ concerns with recognizing such claims).
316
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, § 54, at 360–61 (5th ed. 1984) (identifying “the danger that
claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined; and . . . the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy
and disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for
consequences which appear remote from the ‘wrongful’ act” as among the concerns driving courts).
317
See Kircher, supra note 315, at 810–16 (discussing various tests).
318
Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1983); see also Norboe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
66 Conn. L. Rptr. 112, 126 n.19 (Super. Ct. 2018) (“As medical knowledge advances, the clean
distinction between a person’s mental and physical condition becomes increasingly blurred.”); James v.
Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985) (“While physical manifestation of the psychological injury
may be highly persuasive, such proof is not necessary given the current state of medical science and
advances in psychology.”); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 (Wis. 1994)
(“[G]iven the present state of medical science, emotional distress can be established by means other
than proof of physical manifestation.”).
319
See, e.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 649 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (“The
rule that there must be the mechanical requirement of impact, before recovery will be permitted,
charges with lowered head against the stone wall of the most elementary phenomena observable
practically every day.”).
320
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47
reporters’ notes cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Even among jurisdictions that retain impact as a
requirement, exceptions are sometimes recognized when the circumstances involved provide a
reasonable basis for concluding the plaintiff suffered serious emotional harm. State Dep’t of Corr. v.
Abril, 969 So.2d 201, 202–03 (Fla. 2007) (recognizing exception to impact requirement given the
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resulted from negligent handling of a corpse321 or negligent notification of
the death of a loved one.322
Over time, courts identified other factual scenarios where a defendant
might foreseeably risk serious emotional distress.323 Eventually, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts adopted a rule recognizing liability where the
serious emotional harm resulted from conduct that “occurs in the course of
specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which
negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”324
Examples of such categories include:

er
r

[Where] a physician negligently diagnoses a patient with a dreaded or serious
disease; a physician negligently causes the loss of a fetus; a hospital loses a
newborn infant; a person injures a fetus; a hospital (or another) exposes a
patient to HIV infection; an employer mistreats an employee; or a spouse
mentally abuses the other spouse.325

ot

pe

The examples included in the Restatement are situations in which the
circumstances are special enough to allow a jury to conclude that serious
emotional harm was not only genuine but within the foreseeable scope of
risk created by the defendant’s negligence.326
A similar principle should guide the analysis in cases involving
negligence leading to suicide. Ordinarily, suicide will be outside the
foreseeable scope of the defendant’s negligence. But where a plaintiff is
able to introduce evidence that the facts of their situation are such that
negligent conduct is especially likely to result in suicide, the default rule
regarding suicide and proximate cause should give way.
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foreseeability that emotional distress would result from the failure to ensure the confidentiality of HIV
test results); Moresi v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990) (recognizing an
exception to the physical manifestation requirement where there is “the especial likelihood of genuine
and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the
claim is not spurious”); Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem’l Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629, 635 (W. Va. 1992)
(“[A]n individual may recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress [absent accompanying
physical injury] upon a showing of facts sufficient to guarantee that the emotional damage claim is not
spurious.”). Some courts went beyond this and decided to apply general negligence principles to such
claims, while adopting the requirement that the resulting emotional distress be severe. See Rodrigues v.
State, 472 P.2d 509, 520–21 (Haw. 1970); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996).
321
See Ricottilli, 425 S.E.2d at 635 (discussing this exception).
322
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47
cmt. b (listing this example).
323
Id. § 47 cmt. f.
324
Id. § 47(b).
325
Id. § 47 cmt. f.
326
A comment emphasizes, however, that the test is not solely one of foreseeability. As an
example, the comment notes that it might be foreseeable that a doctor who negligently misdiagnoses a
celebrity as having a fatal disease would cause emotional distress to fans of the celebrity. Id. § 47 cmt. i.
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For example, in Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Group, LLP, a
2011 case from Missouri, a doctor was accused of negligence resulting in
the suicide of the decedent.327 The complaint alleged that the doctor’s
negligence while performing spinal surgery resulted in paralysis from the
waist down.328 The resulting pain experienced by the decedent was so
severe that the touch of a sheet across his legs caused him pain.329 The
decedent had a morphine pump installed to ease his pain, but this proved
unsuccessful.330 Eventually, the decedent ended his own life.331
After the defendant prevailed on his motion for summary judgment in
the lower court, the Missouri Supreme Court focused on the special
causation rule applied in suicide cases in other jurisdictions and noted that
“[m]odern psychiatry supports the idea that suicide sometimes is a
foreseeable result of traumatic injuries.”332 In the case of those with spinal
cord injuries in particular, research indicated that individuals with spinal
cord injuries are at a higher risk of suicide and that those with the form of
paralysis that the decedent had were at a greater risk of suicide than other
categories of individuals with paralysis.333 Other studies have similarly
found those with spinal cord injuries to be at an increased risk of
depression and suicide,334 and much of the popular literature surrounding
spinal cord injuries also references these concepts.335 In short, suicide does
327

Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 303.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 308.
333
See Susan W. Charlifue & Kenneth A. Gerhart, Behavioral and Demographic Predictors of
Suicide After Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury, 72 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 488,
488 (1991) (finding that “death from suicide is two to six times more prevalent than in the general
population” and finding that of 489 deaths of those studied with spinal cord injuries, 9% were due to
suicide) (cited in Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 308 n.12); Andreas Hartkopp et al., Suicide in a Spinal Cord
Injured Population: Its Relation to Functional Status, 79 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. &
REHABILITATION 1356, 1356 (1998) (finding that the suicide rate among those with spinal cord injuries
“was nearly five times higher than expected in the general population” and “that the suicide rate in the
group of marginally disabled persons was nearly twice as high as the group of functionally complete
tetraplegic individuals) (cited in Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 308 n.12).
334
See M. J. DeVivo et al., Suicide Following Spinal Cord Injury, 29 PARAPLEGIA 620, 624–25
(1991) (citing studies showing higher than expected suicide rates among those with spinal cord
injuries); Zahra Khazaeipour et al., Depression Following Spinal Cord Injury: Its Relationship to
Demographic and Socioeconomic Indicators, 21 TOPICS SPINAL CORD INJ. REHABILITATION 149, 149
(2015) (classifying depression as being highly prevalent among those with spinal cord injuries).
335
Tiffany Carlson, Suicide and SCI: Moving Past the Darkness, SPINALCORD.COM (Aug. 22,
2017),
https://www.spinalcord.com/blog/suicide-and-sci-moving-past-the-darkness
[https://perma.cc/YG4M-KGK4] (“While a few people with paralysis claim to have never considered it,
most people who’ve had a spinal cord injury, if they’re being honest with themselves, have.”);
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not have the same lightning-strike quality among those with spinal cord
injuries as it does among the general population. As such, a spinal surgeon
foreseeably risks not only emotional distress as a result of a negligent
procedure but arguably suicide resulting from that distress.336
Other courts have taken a similar approach without explicitly labeling
it as such. For example, in White v. Lawrence, a doctor had treated a patient
with a host of physical ailments.337 The doctor was aware that the patient
was also an alcoholic who suffered from severe depression to the point that
the doctor viewed the patient as a “‘likely candidate’ for suicide.”338 The
doctor, unbeknownst to the patient, prescribed medication in an attempt to
curb the patient’s drinking and encouraged the patient’s wife to administer
the medication covertly.339 The medication made the patient physically sick
to the point that he went to the emergency room for treatment.340 After
being released, the patient took his own life.341
Under the majority approach, the defendant’s suicide would, of
course, have been treated as a superseding cause that cut off the doctor’s
liability. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a jury
question existed on the issue of proximate cause:

ot

pe

The record shows that leading risk factors for suicide include physical illness
and depression. The decedent suffered from both. The plaintiff presented
medical proof that the decedent’s suicide was reasonably foreseeable from a
medical standpoint . . . . Both Dr. Pate and Dr. Smith testified that the
defendant should have reasonably foreseen that secretly prescribing Antabuse
to an alcoholic and depressed patient would cause severe physical problems
and could cause the decedent to choose to end his life. The jury could thus
find that the suicide was the foreseeable result of the defendant’s
negligence.342

tn

The White court’s approach is quite similar to the one advanced in this
Article. The court cited a string of decisions that all held that the decedent’s
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Depression and Spinal Cord Injury (SCI), ST. LUKE’S, https://www.saintlukeskc.org/healthlibrary/depression-and-spinal-cord-injury-sci [https://perma.cc/HZP8-M5UB] (“People with SCI have a
higher rate of depression.”).
336
See Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 313–14 (concluding that summary judgment in favor of surgeon in
a wrongful death action was inappropriate where spinal surgery patient died of suicide following
surgery).
337
White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tenn. 1998).
338
Id.
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
Id. at 527–28.
342
Id. at 530.
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suicide broke the chain of causation.343 One of the cases went so far as to
hold:
[W]here a defendant injures another either willfully or negligently and as a
result of the injury, the injured person commits suicide the act of suicide is, as
a matter of law, an intervening independent cause if the decedent knew and
understood the nature of his or her act or the act resulted from a moderately
intelligent power of choice.344
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But the White court was willing to treat this precedent as establishing more
of a default rule and conclude, based upon the constellation of special
circumstances present and the expert testimony presented, that a jury
question existed as to proximate cause.
What should qualify as the type of evidence necessary to create a jury
question in this context is incapable of precise definition. In the context of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, some courts have dispensed with
most of the special requirements associated with such claims and instead
have adopted a standard negligence approach.345 However, these courts also
sometimes require that the plaintiff prove the existence of severe emotional
distress through expert scientific or medical testimony.346
This same type of evidence may often be necessary in wrongful death
cases involving suicide to establish not only that the defendant’s negligence
was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s suicide but that the pain caused by the
defendant’s negligence made suicide a foreseeable result.347 Science has not
progressed to the point where it can predict with certainty whether one
person versus another will commit suicide. But the scientific research and
understanding of suicide has progressed to where experts can sometimes
testify authoritatively that the circumstances were such that a particular
plaintiff was at a statistically greater risk of suicide than the average person
to the point that suicide was foreseeable.348 Expert testimony may also be
343

Id.
Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added).
345
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446
(Tenn. 1996).
346
See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766–67 (Haw. 1974); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446
(concluding that “claimed injury or impairment must be supported by expert medical or scientific
proof”).
347
See generally Leong, 520 P.2d at 767 (“While a psychiatrist may not be able to establish a
negligent act as the sole cause of plaintiff’s neurosis, he can give a fairly accurate estimate of the
probable effects the act will have upon the plaintiff and whether the trauma induced was a precipitating
cause of neurosis, and whether the resulting neurosis is beyond a level of pain with which a reasonable
man may be expected to cope.”).
348
See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text (discussing studies finding increased risk of
suicide in some cases).
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particularly relevant in some instances, such as in the case of teen suicide
where neuroscience has provided valuable insight into how the adolescent
brain develops.349
In at least some instances, however, the application of common sense
may be sufficient. So, for example, the fact that an individual suffers from
depression should not, absent other circumstances, be enough to raise an
issue regarding proximate cause.350 But the fact that a defendant is aware
that the decedent had recently attempted suicide may be.351
The approach described here may also be employed in cases where the
alleged negligence involves the failure to prevent suicide. Patton v.
Bickford is a 2016 case from Kentucky in which an eighth grader
committed suicide, allegedly as a result of bullying.352 The decedent’s estate
filed negligence actions against various teachers and administrators who
allegedly knew or should have known that the child was being bullied but
failed to take reasonable steps to stop it.353 The lower court granted
summary judgment to the teachers on the predictable grounds that the
child’s suicide was a superseding cause that relieved the defendants of
liability.354 On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court applied standard
scope-of-risk analysis while also taking into account the public dimensions
of suicide. The court noted “that bullying as a source of torment has been
recognized as a foreseeable cause of suicide and medical/psychological
professionals now widely acknowledge this societal concern.”355
Interestingly, in support of its conclusion, the court referenced the fact that
the Kentucky Board of Education’s website contained a letter to teachers
noting that “student suicides resulting from the bullying and harassment
activities of other youths have escalated” in recent years.356 Thus, the Board
of Education itself viewed suicide as a foreseeable result of the failure to
prevent bullying.

349
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See Andrea MacIver, Suicide Causation Experts in Teen Wrongful Death Claims: Will They
Assist the Trier of Fact?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 51, 68–75 (2011) (discussing advancements in
neuroscience with respect to the adolescent brain and the value of expert testimony on this issue).
350
See Rafferman v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that defendant could not have reasonably foreseen decedent’s suicide despite the awareness
that decedent had “become ‘visibly and obviously depressed’”).
351
Cf. Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 575 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We can think of no other
facts that would have given school officials more reason to anticipate Shawn’s suicide than Shawn’s
two recent, overt suicide attempts.”).
352
Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2016).
353
Id. at 721.
354
Id. at 722.
355
Id. at 733.
356
Id.
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Patton is also noteworthy for its recognition of the role tort law can
play in addressing the public health problem that is suicide. In its decision,
the court also referenced recent “bullying bills” enacted in Kentucky that
“mandate[d] that school teachers be trained in suicide prevention
policies.”357 This fact served not only as evidence as to the foreseeability of
suicide in the case of bullying but also as evidence of a “public policy
decision to stop bullying in schools.”358 The court was thus able to tie the
legislation to the policy-driven nature of the proximate cause requirement
and the traditional role tort law has played in deterring “harmful socially
unacceptable behavior by imposing liability upon the wrongdoer for the
wrong done.”359
The Patton decision is also noteworthy for what it does not do. One
possible objection to the approach this Article proposes is that it will lead
to increased liability. Perhaps. But in addition to raising a jury question as
to proximate cause, a plaintiff must also ultimately prove that the
defendant’s actions were a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s suicide. In Patton,
the plaintiff was unable to meet this burden.360 Without an obvious causal
link or expert testimony regarding whether the bullying actually caused the
suicide, the plaintiff was unable to survive summary judgment on the issue
of causation.361 Thus, Patton serves as a reminder of the difficult road that
those seeking to recover under a negligence theory face, even without
application of the suicide rule.
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2. Abolishing the Rage or Frenzy/Delirium or Insanity Exception
Courts should also abolish the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity
exception to the standard suicide rule. The exception is a relic from a time
when suicide was not well understood, when societal attitudes on the
subject were quite different, and when suicide remained a crime. The
exception has always primarily reflected a view of fault or lack thereof on
the part of a decedent. Now that nearly every state has adopted a system of
comparative fault, decisions as to the fault of the decedent are better dealt
with as part of this analysis. Indeed, it is noteworthy that while the
Restatement (Third) of Torts references some of the decisions involving
suicide and proximate cause, the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity
exception does not appear in the third Restatement.362
357

Id.
Id.
359
Id. at 733–34.
360
Id. at 736.
361
Id.
362
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (referencing suicide cases
and proximate cause but omitting any reference to this exception).
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There are other reasons to abolish the exception. The law can play a
role as a part of a multidisciplinary approach to the public health problem
of suicide.363 At a minimum, it should not further misunderstandings that
prevent progress. The sense of shame and stigma that often accompanies
depression and related conditions tends to discourage those who are
considering suicide from seeking help.364 Aside from crafting legal rules
that are consistent with the goal of reducing the number of suicides, courts
can shape the law in ways that do not perpetuate the sorts of stereotypes
that discourage those with depression or thoughts of suicide from seeking
treatment. By eliminating the unhelpful and antiquated rage or
frenzy/delirium or insanity exception, courts can shape the law regarding
suicide and tort law in a manner that better reflects more modern
understandings of suicide and its prevention.
3. Comparative Fault
Given the fact that most suicides will still remain outside of the scope
of risk created by a defendant’s negligence under the proposed approach,

363
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See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Suicide Prevention: A Public
Health
Issue,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/asap_suicide_issue2-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9D6-Q4UF] (discussing the role of multidisciplinary perspectives in public health);
SUICIDE
PREVENTION
RES.
CTR.,
Suicide
Prevention
and
Policy
Legislation,
https://www.sprc.org/sites/default/files/resource-program/FromthefieldLegislation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L55P-CUFM] (discussing state laws aimed at suicide prevention). Tort law has
sometimes been used as a means of addressing public health issues. See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil
Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J. L. MED. ETHICS 224, 225 (2002)
(“In recent years, the most ardent proponents of litigation as public policy have been public health
advocates.”); W. E. Parmet & R. A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 437, 437 (2000) (“Increasingly, individuals and organizations concerned about public health
have sought to use litigation to further their goals. In other words, courts are now being used
affirmatively in an effort to make public health policy.”); Stephen P. Teret & Michael Jacobs,
Prevention and Torts: The Role of Litigation in Injury Control, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 17, 19–20
(1989) (discussing the role that litigation plays in preventing injuries from dangerous products).
364
See Mark E. Hastings et al., Shame, Guilt, and Suicide, in SUICIDE SCIENCE 76–77 (Thomas
Joiner & M. David Rudd eds., 2002) (“Theory and emerging empirical research indicates that feelings
of shame are more prominent than guilt in the dynamics leading up to suicidal thoughts and
behaviors.”); Kimberly Arditte Hall, Interpersonal Risk for Suicide in Social Anxiety: The Roles of
Shame and Depression, 239 PSYCHIATRY RES. 139, 139 (2016) (analyzing how shame and depression
may help to explain the relationship between social anxiety and interpersonal suicide risk factors);
Maanvi Singh, Study: Vast Majority of People Who Are Depressed Do Not Seek Help, NPR (Dec. 2,
2016, 2:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/12/02/504131307/study-vastmajority-of-people-who-are-depressed-do-not-seek-help [https://perma.cc/7ZYA-5XQE] (noting that
the stigma associated with depression discourages people from seeking help); Alice G. Walton, Why
Are So Many People with Depression Not Getting Treatment?, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 10:18 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alicegwalton/2018/02/09/why-are-so-many-people-with-depression-not-getting-treated/#23b810a1b2fb
[https://perma.cc/BKF2-2A22] (suggesting that one reason why people diagnosed with depression do
not seek treatment is because of the stigma associated with depression).
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the concerns over expanded liability should be limited. Any remaining
concerns are largely addressed through application of standard comparative
fault principles.365 By permitting juries to take the decedent’s own actions
into account when comparing the relative responsibilities of the parties,
courts can better respect a jurisdiction’s determinations as to the operation
of comparative fault principles while also better reflecting modern views
regarding suicide.366
Where a defendant’s negligence is alleged to have affirmatively
contributed to the decedent’s suicide, a jury should be permitted to consider
the decedent’s own actions when comparing the respective responsibilities
of the parties. The fact that the decedent’s own actions were the most direct
cause of death might increase the decedent’s share of responsibility.367 In
apportioning responsibility, many courts take the position that the
plaintiff’s contributory negligence must be evaluated by using a subjective
standard that takes into account the plaintiff’s own mental state, including
any mental impairments.368 The fact that the decedent had an existing
psychiatric disability at the time of the suicide may reduce, but not
completely eliminate, the decedent’s portion of responsibility. Thus, a
plaintiff is not forced to advocate for the all-or-nothing form of
responsibility mandated by the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity
exception to the suicide rule, nor is a court forced to apply it. Where,
however, the decedent’s psychiatric disability truly prevented the decedent
from understanding the physical nature and consequences of his actions,369
the decedent would no longer be at fault at all, and comparative negligence
principles would not reduce recovery.370

Pr

ep

rin

tn

Currently, there are few cases fitting this fact pattern in which the decedent’s fault is considered
for purposes of comparative fault analysis. See Allison C. v. Advanced Educ. Servs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d
605, 611 (Ct. App. 2005) (involving jury verdict apportioning 2% of fault to teen with psychiatric issues
who killed himself); Rubin v. Aaron, 594 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 1993) (involving jury verdict
apportioning 80% of responsibility to negligent defendant). This is undoubtedly because the suicide rule
effectively dispenses with the majority of claims involving this set of facts.
366
See generally Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 832–36 (Tex. 2013) (citing Texas’s
proportionate responsibility in support of refusal to apply the “unlawful acts” doctrine to bar recovery
where decedent died after ingesting heroin).
367
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (listing “the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the
harm” as a relevant consideration in apportioning responsibility).
368
See Dodson v. State Dep’t. of Human Servs., 703 N.W.2d 353, 357–59 (S.D. 2005) (discussing
majority rule of applying the subjective standard); Gray v. Roten, No. W2010-00614-COA-R3-CV,
2011 WL 236115, at *10 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing cases that use the subjective
standard).
369
See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text (discussing this prong of the exception).
370
See Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Iowa 2011) (“Whether a
person suffering from a mental disease lacks the capacity to be found negligent is generally a question
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In cases where the defendant owes a duty to take reasonable measures
to prevent suicide, the suicide rule has not served as the same sort of
limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to recover as it has in other cases.
Therefore, the issue of comparative fault has come up more frequently. The
general rule that has emerged is that where the decedent was in the custody
of the defendant—for example, where the decedent was a prisoner or where
the decedent was a patient confined to a hospital under a suicide watch—
the decedent’s own actions do not reduce recovery.371 In the noncustodial
setting, however, normal comparative fault principles typically apply and
the decedent’s own actions may reduce recovery.372
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In the case of an intentional tort resulting in suicide, the current
majority approach, which requires that the defendant’s conduct be a
substantial factor in causing the suicide in order for the defendant to be
held liable,373 already strikes the appropriate balance. Introducing the issue
of foreseeability into intentional tort analysis is inconsistent with the
principles underlying tort law and is only likely to lead to confusion. And
introducing the suicide rule and its exceptions into this area is inadvisable
for the reasons discussed previously.
Regardless of the precise formulation of the test,374 the majority
approach gives effect to the basic tort principle that a defendant who
engages in intentional wrongdoing is more culpable than one who is merely
negligent, and should thus not be able to claim the unforeseeability of a
negative consequence as an excuse for avoiding liability.375 At the same
time, by requiring that the defendant’s conduct be more than a trivial cause
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of fact.”); Dodson, 703 N.W.2d at 357 (“One whose mental faculties are diminished, not amounting to
total insanity, is capable of contributory negligence, but is not held to the objective reasonable-person
standard.” (quoting 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 864 (2005))).
371
See Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18–19 (Ind. 1998); see also Cole v.
Multnomah Cty., 592 P.2d 221, 223 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); c.f. P.W. v. Children’s Hosp., 364 P.3d 891,
894–95, 898 (Colo. 2016) (holding that hospital was liable for a patient’s damages resultant from his
failed suicide attempt because “the hospital [knew he was] actively suicidal, and . . . the admission
[was] for the purpose of preventing [his] self-destructive behavior”); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159,
161, 167 (N.J. 1988) (holding that a hospital’s staff members were liable for damages resulting from a
patient’s failed suicide attempt because they “were aware of her condition, [and] their duty was to
prevent [her] self-damaging actions”).
372
See Mulhern, 799 N.W.2d at 115–16; Maunz v. Perales, 76 P.3d 1027, 1033–34 (Kan. 2003).
373
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
374
See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing variations).
375
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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of the resulting suicide376 and by requiring that causation usually be
established through expert testimony,377 courts can effectively check the
possibility of strict liability. Moreover, the nature of most claims will serve
as an inherent limitation on the scope of liability. The vast majority of the
decisions in the area involve the alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress resulting in suicide.378 The requirement of this claim that the
defendant’s conduct be extreme and outrageous already serves to limit the
number of instances in which defendants may be held liable.379 Assuming
courts do not lower the bar on this element of an IIED claim, the number of
potential claims should be fairly limited without having to resort to other,
more awkward causation standards.
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The standard suicide rule that applies in negligence and some
intentional tort cases is based on outdated science and a debatable appraisal
of society’s views concerning the morality of suicide. The same is true of
its rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception. The former rule tends to
short-circuit commonsense inquiry into causation while the latter tends to
further harmful stereotypes. At a time when suicide is increasingly
recognized as a serious public health issue, courts do a disservice to those
impacted by suicide by continuing to apply these rules. While the special
and often unpredictable nature of suicide needs to be taken into account in
wrongful death actions, tort law already has the tools in place to effectively
deal with such cases. Courts need only begin using them.

376
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 36
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“When an actor’s negligent conduct constitutes only a trivial contribution to a
causal set that is a factual cause of harm [in the case of multiple sufficient causes], the harm is not
within the scope of the actor’s liability.”).
377
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
378
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
379
See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
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